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The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA)1 was proposed in 1955 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Since that time,
well over half of the states have enacted statutes modeled after the UAA.2
This survey's purpose is to present and explain recent decisions interpreting
the UAA, and assist in analyzing future cases.3
1. VARIATIONS ON THE UAA
Tennessee and Kentucky have recently adopted the UAA.4 Although
these acts are in substantial conformity with the model act, the Tennessee and
Kentucky statutes contain some significant modifications and omissions from
the model act which are worthy of consideration.
A. Tennessee
Tennessee's most significant modification is section 1. Section 1 of the
UAA provides that a clause in a written contract to submit a dispute to arbi-
tration is valid, enforceable and irrevocable. 5 Further, section 1 provides that
I. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (1955), 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UAA].
2. Jurisdictions that have enacted statutes modeled after the UAA include
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.
3. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J. DIs-
PUTE RESOLUTION 207 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments 1984]; Re-
cent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Recent Developments 1983]. The 1984 survey collected cases interpreting
and applying the UAA decided between September, 1982 and September, 1983. The
1983 survey collected recent cases interpreting and applying the UAA decided before
September, 1982. This article surveys cases decided between September, 1983 and Au-
gust, 1984.
4. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301-20 (1983); 1984 Ky. REV. STAT. & R. SERV.
§§ 417.050-.240 (Baldwin).
5. UAA § I provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy there-
after arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract. This act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and
[Vol. 1985
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valid arbitration agreements can be made between employees and employers.6
The Tennessee statute, in comparison, does not make every arbitration clause
in a written contract enforceable.7 In a specific protected class of transactions,
not only do the parties have to assent to the contract for the arbitration agree-
ment to be valid,8 but the parties must additionally sign or initial the specific
clause which provides for arbitration.' The protected class of transactions in
which the arbitration clause must be signed or initialed includes contracts re-
lating to "farm property, structures or goods, or to property and structures
utilized as a residence of a party .. ."'0 The policy behind signing or initial-
ing the arbitration clause is to insure that these clauses are read. A contract
pertaining to a statutorily protected transaction which contains an arbitration
clause which is not signed or initialed will result in the arbitration clause being
struck from the rest of the contract.
The Tennessee statute also differs from section 1 by omitting any mention
of the enforceability of arbitration agreements in employment contracts."
Whether such agreements will be enforceable can be argued either way. Since
the Tennessee statute deviates from the model act which explicitly includes a
provision asserting that employer--employee arbitration agreements are
valid, 2 it could be argued that the legislature's intent was to not recognize
such agreements. However, a fair reading of the Tennessee statute does not
indicate any intent to exclude arbitration agreements when the parties stand in
an employer--employee relationship. Further, many states which have
adopted versions of the model act have explicitly excluded em-
ployer-employee arbitration agreements' s as opposed to Tennessee's failure
employees or between their respective representatives [unless otherwise pro-
vided in the agreement].
6. Id.
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (1983) provides:
(a) A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract; provided, however, that for contracts relating to farm property,
structures or goods, or to property and structures utilized as a residence of a
party, the clause providing for arbitration shall be additionally signed or
initialed by the parties.
(emphasis added)
8. See UAA § 1; see also Wamego v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co., Inc., 9 Kan. App.
2d 168, -, 675 P.2d 912, 916 (1984) (if the parties are not bound to the contract,
arbitration is not proper).
9. Supra note 7.
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (1983).
11. Id.
12. UAA § 1.
13. At least ten jurisdictions have explicitly excluded arbitration agreements be-
tween employers and employees: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland,
1985]
3
et al.: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
to mention whether such agreements are arbitrable.
Tennessee's version of the UAA also omits several provisions of the model
act. The most significant omissions are sections 20 and 22. Section 20 stipu-
lates that the act is not retroactive. 14 Consequently, the act only applies to
agreements made after the act takes effect. Tennessee's omission of the provi-
sion can be interpreted as meaning that the UAA applies to all arbitration
agreements whether made before or after the act has taken effect.'"
Section 22 provides that all the provisions of the model act are severa-
ble."6 The omission of the provision from the Tennessee act permits the entire
arbitration statute to be declared invalid if one section is found unconstitu-
tional. 17 It has been contended that the absence of a severability provision may
make it more difficult to hold a section of a statute unconstitutional since the
consequence of such a ruling would invalidate the entire act. 8
B. Kentucky
Kentucky has also omitted 9 and modified2 0 significant provisions from the
model act. First, Kentucky, like Tennessee,2' has omitted the severability pro-
vision from the model act.2
Second, Kentucky modified section 1 of the UAA to explicitly prohibit
arbitration of insurance contracts and employment contracts. 2 3 Third, Ken-
tucky modified the law concerning when a court may order a rehearing before
new arbitrators after an arbitration award has been vacated. Section 12 of the
UAA allows a rehearing after vacating an award produced by "corruption,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, 7 U.L.A. 5-6 (1978), Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Texas, 7 U.L.A. Cum. Supp. 1984.
14. UAA § 20 provides: "This act applies only to agreements made subsequent
to the taking effect of this act."
15. This would not be a violation of the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution, U. S. CONsTr. art. I, § 10, since it is not impairing the rights of the parties
but rather modifying the means of enforcing those rights.
16. UAA § 22 provides:
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.
17. See Recent Developments 1984, supra note 3, at 207-08.
18. Id. at 201. At least six other states have omitted this section from their
versions of the UAA: Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Nevada, 7 U.L.A.
81 (1978), and Kentucky, infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
19. Kentucky's version of the UAA omits UAA §§ 15, 22 and 24.
20. Kentucky modified UAA §§ I and 12.
21. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
22. See UAA § 22.
23. 1984 Ky. REV. STAT. & R. SERV. § 417.050 (Baldwin); cf. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 435.350 (Supp. 1983) (prohibits arbitration of insurance contracts).
[ Vol. 1985
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fraud, or other undue means;" however, this section does not allow a rehearing
if the court finds that there was "no arbitration agreement and the issues were
not adversely determined. '2 4 The Kentucky provision is the converse of the
UAA since it allows a court to order a rehearing after vacating an award if it
was found that no arbitration agreement existed and the issues were not ad-
versely determined.2 Further, when an award is vacated because of "corrup-
tion, fraud, or other undue means" a rehearing is not allowed.2 6 This modifica-
tion from the model act makes little sense. It is a waste of time to order a
rehearing before new arbitrators if no valid arbitration agreement existed be-
tween the parties. Furthermore, an arbitration award procured by corruption,
fraud or other undue means can only be vacated; there is no statutory author-
ity to order a rehearing.
II. VALIDITY OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Under the UAA, arbitration agreements are to be enforced except where
legal or equitable grounds exist to revoke the agreement. Several states that
24. UAA § 12(a) provides:
Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1)
The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2)
There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or cor-
ruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue
was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party
did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection;
but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm
the award.
UAA § 12(c) provides:
In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of Sub-
section (a) the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as
provided in the agtreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accor-
dance with Section 3, or if the award is vacated on grounds set forth in
clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court may order a rehearing before
the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in accor-
dance with Section 3. The time within which the agreement requires the
award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the
date of the order.
25. 1984 Ky. REV. SrAT. & R. SERV. § 417.160 (Baldwin).
26. Id.
27. UAA § I provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
1985]
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have adopted the UAA, however, forbid arbitration agreements concerning
certain matters.2 8 Recent decisions suggest various considerations affecting the
validity of an arbitration agreement: (1) the statute may be narrowly con-
strued to avoid a statutory exception; (2) whether the possibility of piecemeal
resolution of a dispute renders an arbitration agreement- invalid; (3) the terms
of the underlying contract determine whether an arbitration- clause is enforce-
able, and by whom; and (4) public policy considerations may render certain
arbitration agreements unenforceable.
A. Statutory Construction
Generally, state courts have chosen to construe arbitration statutes
broadly in order to promote a policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.2 9 For
example, in Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon & Co.,30 the Maryland Court of
Appeals determined that an arbitration agreement in an employment contract
between a professional corporation and an individual was enforceable.31 Mary-
land's arbitration statute validates any agreement to arbitrate a present or fu-
ture controversy except where grounds exist at law or in equity for revocation
of the agreement.3 2 In contrast to the UAA, however, Maryland's version of
the UAA will not apply between employers and employees or their respective
representatives unless it is expressly provided that the arbitration statute will
apply.3 3 Wilson had signed a series of employment contracts with McGrow, an
accounting firm, which contained an agreement to settle controversies by arbi-
tration. Wilson then left to start his own accounting firm. McGrow sued Wil-
son for breach of fiduciary duties to McGrow. Wilson petitioned the trial court
to compel arbitration. The trial court and intermediate appellate court denied
enforcement of the arbitration clause because the contract involved was be-
tween an employer and employee. The intermediate court stated that the Ma-
ryland's arbitration statute required an express provision in the contract stat-
ing that the statute would apply. The court then ruled that such an express
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. This act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers
and employees or between their respective representatives [unless otherwise
provided in their agreement].
28. See Recent Developments 1983, supra note 3, at 146.
29. See id. at 147.
30. 298 Md. 66, 467 A.2d 1025 (1983).
31. Id. at 78, 467 A.2d at 1031.
32. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-206(a) (1984).
33. Id. at § 3-206(b). This provision differs from UAA § 1, which states in
pertinent part: "This act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1985, Iss.  [1985], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/11
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
agreement was absent. 4 On appeal, The Maryland Court of Appeals conceded
that an express agreement was absent, but construed the Maryland arbitration
statute broadly, holding that the intent of the Maryland legislature was to
exclude only employment contracts that had been bargained for collectively
and not those similar to the one between McGrow and Wilson. 5 Therefore,
the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decision and granted enforce-
ment of the agreement.36
Another decision involving a statutory restriction on the enforceability of
an arbitration clause was State ex rel. Tri-City Construction Co. v. Marsh.37
In Marsh, the respondent argued that an arbitration agreement was unen-
forceable because it did not contain a notice of arbitration as required by Mis-
souri's arbitration act. 38 Although the Missouri statute requires that notice be
included in each contract, the court reasoned that the law favors a statutory
reading which results in a reasonable interpretation. Since the contract in-
volved was solely an agreement to arbitrate, the court, in holding the arbitra-
tion agreement enforceable, stated that it would have been illogical and unnec-
essary to include a notice clause. 39
B. Piecemeal Resolution
In Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima,4 0 the Arizona
Court of Appeals held that although only one of several respondent subcon-
tractors had an arbitration agreement with the petitioner general contractor,
the arbitration agreement was valid."' The court stated that "arbitration law
requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration
agreement."4
This rationale was further supported by the decision in J & K Cement
Construction Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc."3 In this case, subcontractors
attempted to foreclose on a lien against several property owners. The property
owners crossclaimed against the general contractor. The general contractor
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the general
34. Wilson, 298 Md. at 69, 467 A.2d at 1026.
35. Id. at 78, 467 A.2d at 1031.
36. Id.
37. 668 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
38. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (Supp. 1982) requires contracts containing arbi-
tration clauses to contain the following notice: "This contract contains a binding arbi-
tration provision which may be enforced by the parties." For a discussion of the Mis-
souri arbitration statute, including the notice requirement, see Recent Developments
1983, supra note 3, at 140-42.
39. Marsh, 668 S.W.2d at 153.
40. 138 Ariz. 410, 675 P.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1984).
41. Id. at _ , 675 P.2d at 299.
42. Id.
43. 119 II1. App. 3d 663, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983).
1985]
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contractor and the property owners. The trial court denied a motion by the
general contractor, Montalbano, to compel arbitration."" The Appellate Court
of Illinois reversed, holding that the subcontractor's argument for efficiency
was not strong enough to overcome the policy favoring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.4"
C. Application of Contract Principles
Many decisions determining the validity of arbitration agreements involve
an analysis of the contractual language and relationships. Recent cases indi-
cate that the ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply in determining the
validity of a particular provision.
In Computer Corp. of America v. Zarecor"6 the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of determining the parties to an arbitration agree-
ment, A developer brought an action against the promoters of a corporation to
recover his licensing fee because the corporation had never been created. The
promoters sought to compel arbitration by invoking the arbitration agreement
between the corporation and the developer. Since the promoters were never
intended to be parties to the agreement, the court found that they had no
power to compel arbitration. The court emphasized that the policy of the
UAA is to enforce contracts as broadly as the parties intended, but that those
who were not parties to the agreement had no right to compel arbitration no
matter how broadly the agreement was construed. 7
Another frequently encountered problem involving validity arises where
one party tries to use an arbitration agreement to force a dispute over the
existence of the underlying contract to arbitrate. Generally, courts have held
that if the contract's existence is disputed, a party cannot rely on the arbitra-
tion provision of the contract in question to force arbitration.
In Paramore v. Inter-regional Financial Group Leasing Co.,4 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether a lease dispute
was subject to arbitration based on the arbitration provision contained in the
lease. The dispute concerned whether a farm lease agreement had been cre-
ated through fraud and forgery. The court held that the arbitration agreement
could not be enforced to compel arbitration when the agreement was part of
the contract in dispute, and that the validity of the contract as a whole must
be established to show the validity of the arbitration agreement.49
In City of Wamego v. L.R. Foy Construction Co.,50 the Kansas Court of
44. Id. at 666, 456 N.E.2d at 892.
45. Id. at 675-78, 456 N.E.2d at 900-03.
46. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 452 N.E.2d 267 (1983).
47. Id. at __ , 452 N.E.2d at 269.
48. 68 N.C. App. 659, 316 S.E.2d 90 (1984).
49. Id. at __ , 316 S.E.2d at 92.
50. 9 Kan. App. 2d 168, 675 P.2d 912 (1984).
[Vol. 1985
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Appeals applied a similar analysis to a dispute in which the party who repudi-
ated the contract sought to compel arbitration. Although the written contract
included a provision giving each party the right to compel arbitration, the city
claimed that Foy waived its right to compel arbitration when it denied the
existence of a binding contract. The court ruled that if the dispute is over
whether the contract has been executed, that issue cannot go to arbitration
under the clause. 51 Foy argued, however, that this rule did not apply because
the arbitration agreement was severable from the underlying contract. The
court rejected Foy's argument, saying that where there is no evidence of an
independent meeting of the minds on the arbitration agreement, the agreement
is not severable. 52
In Fraternal Order of Police v. Village of Washington Park,53 an Illinois
appellate court held the fact that one party may have violated the terms of an
agreement is not enough to make the arbitration provision contained therein
unenforceable. Fraternal Order involved an epidemic of "blue flu" among the
members of the village police force following the firing of one of their union
organizers. The village claimed that the action constituted a strike which
breached their employment contract and gave the village the right to pass a
resolution terminating the agreement. The court found, however, that the vil-
lage did not have the unilateral right to revoke the agreement. Since earlier
decisions held that the UAA was part of the agreement as a matter of law, the
parties' agreement was irrevocable except by their mutual consent.54
D. Statutory Causes of Action
Another reason that arbitration agreements may be rendered unenforce-
able is that courts favor litigation of certain statutory causes of action. In
Blow v. Shaughnessy,55 the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that
securities trading litigation should not be stayed pending arbitration even
though there was an arbitration clause in the securities agreement between the
plaintiffs and respondents. 5' A factor in the court's ruling was a pending Se-
curities and Exchange Commission regulation stating that any securities bro-
ker who entered into an agreement binding the customer to arbitration con-
cerning disputes arising under federal securities laws had committed a
fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive act.5 7 The court stated that although
51. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 916.
52. Id. (citing Pollux Marine Agencies v. Louis Dreyfuss Corp., 455 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
53. 123 I1l. App. 3d 26, 462 N.E.2d 855 (1994).
54. Id. at __, 462 N.E.2d at 857.
55. 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868 (1984).
56. Id. at ___, 313 S.E.2d at 874.
57. Id. at __, 313 S.E.2d at 876. The rule involved, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404
(1983) (to be codified at 17. C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2), provides in pertinent part:
(a) it shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a
1985]
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North Carolina law approves arbitration as a manner of settling disputes,5" it
was compelled to recognize the federal law and underlying policy as relevant.5 9
Antitrust cases are another area where federal policy is relevant in deter-
mining whether an issue should be arbitrated. In Sabates v. International
Medical Centers, Inc.,"0 a Florida District Court of Appeal ruled that a state
antitrust claim was not a proper subject for arbitration."' The court stated that
although Florida favors agreements to arbitrate, that policy was not without
exceptions.6 2 Although the Florida Antitrust Act 6" contained no express provi-
sion preserving the right of litigation, the court stated that the policy favoring
arbitration must give way to the policy favoring litigation of antitrust claims. 4
The court held that because this issue had not been addressed in Florida
courts, "great weight" was to be given federal authority, which does not allow
arbitration of antitrust claims.65
Arbitration is a useful tool which provides for economical, speedy resolu-
tion of disputes. Courts generally construe arbitration statutes broadly to pro-
mote the enforceability of arbitration agreements. It is apparent, however, that
when the public in general has an economic interest in the outcome, as in
cases involving antitrust and securities practices, courts are hesitant to enforce
arbitration agreements.
III. WAIVER
The right to arbitrate is a contract right which can be waived.6 6 By waiv-
broker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which
purports to bind the customer to an arbitration of future disputes between
them arising under the federal securities laws, or to have in effect such an
agreement, pursuant to which it effects transactions with or for a customer.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1.567.1-1.567.20 (1983).
59. Blow, 68 N.C. App. at __ , 313 S.E.2d at 876. The court indicated that
the Securities Act was promulgated to protect the rights of investors and that federal
policy forbids a waiver of any of these rights.
60. 450 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
61. Id. at 516-17.
62. Id. at 516.
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 542.15-542.36 (West Supp. 1985).
64. Sabates, 450 So. 2d at 516-17.
65. Id. at 517; see, e.g., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); A.
& E. Plastic Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968). The court indi-
cated that federal policy not to arbitrate antitrust claims had several rationales. First,
antitrust claims affect a wide range of public interests. Second, complexity of antitrust
claims make them more suitable for a judicial forum. Third, commercial arbitrators
should not be allowed to decide matters of such great public interest. Finally, arbitra-
tors are not bound by rules of law and do not have to cite reasons for their rulings.
Sabates, 450 So. 2d at 517.
66. Gold Coast Mall v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 108, 468 A.2d 91, 98
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ing the right to arbitrate, a party loses the power to compel arbitration of
disputes covered by the arbitration provision . 7 Waiver, therefore, is an impor-
tant preliminary issue which must be decided when a dispute arises and one of
the parties seeks to compel arbitration. If both parties submit themselves to
the court's jurisdiction in determining a dispute, they waive their right to enter
into subsequent arbitration agreements, 68 and the court cannot order binding
arbitration even if both parties consent.0 9
In determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate, the court
looks for conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate.7 0 However, the con-
duct and surrounding circumstances must evidence a clear intent to forego the
use of arbitration. 7 1 Waiver will not be found from equivocal language or con-
duct. " Examples of conduct which constitute a waiver of a party's right to
arbitrate include: (1) repudiating the entire contract of which the arbitration
agreement was a part;73 (2) utilizing litigation to settle a dispute which the
agreement specified was to be arbitrated;7 and (3) "preventing arbitration,
making arbitration impossible, proceeding at all times in disregard of the arbi-
tration clause, expressly agreeing to waive arbitration, or unreasonable de-
lay."'75 Waiver will not be inferred, however, when a party who does not have
the obligation to initiate arbitration does not do so.76 Nor will waiver be found
when the action which allegedly constitutes a waiver occurred in a completely
independent lawsuit.77
A. Repudiation of the Underlying Contract
In City of Wamego v. L.R. Foy Construction Co.,7 8 the Kansas Court of
Appeals ruled that repudiation of the contract containing an arbitration provi-
sion acts as a waiver of the right to arbitrate.7 9 Wamego sued L.R. Foy Con-
struction Company (Foy) for breach of contract after the latter denied the
(1983).
67. City of Wamego v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 168 .... 675
P.2d 912, 916 (1984).
68. Rustad v. Rustad, 68 N.C. App. 58, -, 314 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1984).
69. Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 67 N.C. App. 278, _ , 312
S.E.2d 709, 711 (1984).
70. Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima, 138 Ariz. 410,
675 P.2d 297, 299 (Ct. App. 1984).
71. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 109, 468 A.2d at 98.
72. Id.
73. Ciy of Wamego, 9 Kan. App. 2d at -, 675 P.2d at 916.
74. Cyclone Roofing, 67 N.C. App. at __ , 312 S.E.2d at 711.
75. Forest'City, 138 Ariz. at -, 675 P.2d at 299.
76. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 113, 468 A.2d at 98.
77. Forest City, 138 Ariz. at -, 675 P.2d at 299.
78. 9 Kan. App. 2d 168, 675 P.2d 912 (1984).
79. Id. at - , 675 P.2d at 916.
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existence of a contract between it and the city.80 Foy moved to stay the suit
and compel arbitration. 8' The court ruled that the arbitration provision could
not be held a separate contract absent evidence of an independent meeting of
the minds regarding arbitration.8 2 It then noted that Foy did not qualify or
limit its repudiation of the contract and held that the repudiation constituted
conduct "inconsistent with a continued right to compel arbitration. "'
B. Participation in the Judicial Process
In Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co.,84 the court held that
pursuing legal adjudication of a dispute constituted a waiver of the right to
arbitrate.85 Cyclone Roofing Company was a subcontractor of LaFave Com-
pany (LaFave) for a contract which required the latter to construct a house
for Joseph and Emma Frye (the Fryes). Cyclone sued both LaFave and the
Fryes. LaFave then filed a cross-claim against the Fryes, who answered with a
cross-claim against LaFave and its owner individually. In its answer to the
Fryes' cross-claim, LaFave alleged for the first time that arbitration was man-
dated by its contract with the Fryes.8" The court ruled that after the defen-
dants filed cross-claims against each other, a civil suit was pending; therefore,
the court could not order arbitration "even with the consent of both parties."87
The dissent argued that participation in litigation or other conduct inconsistent
with a right to arbitrate should not result in waiver absent prejudice to the
other party. Finding that the Fryes had not been prejudiced by LaFaves's legal
actions, the dissent would have affirmed the trial court's order directing
arbitration .88
In Rustad v. Rustad,89 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina also ruled
that submitting a dispute to litigation results in a waiver of the right to arbi-
trate. An ex-husband brought suit against his former wife to reduce his sup-
port obligations under their separation agreement. The defendant moved to
dismiss on the basis that she and her former spouse were contractually bound
to submit that issue to mediation and arbitration. 90 The court held that both
parties had waived their right to arbitrate disputes under the separation agree-
80. Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 915.
81. Id. at __ 675 P.2d at 913.
82. Id. at __ 675 P.2d at 916.
83. Id. at__, 675 P.2d at 917.
84. 67 N.C. App. 278, 312 S.E.2d 709 (1984).
85. Id. at __, 312 S.E.2d at 711.
86. Id. at __, 312 S.E.2d at 710.
87. The court noted that LaFave's cross-claim was permissive and not compul-
sory and that the conduct of both parties in filing such claims constituted the election
of a legal forum and a waiver of their right to arbitrate. Id. at -, 312 S.E.2d at 711.
88. Id. at -, 312 S.E.2d at 712.
89. 68 N.C. App. 58, 314 S.E.2d 275 (1984).
90. Id. at __, 314 S.E.2d at 277.
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ment by submitting themselves to the court's jurisdiction in an earlier custody
dispute involving the same agreement.9 1 Further, the court ruled that the par-
ties had foreclosed their right to enter into subsequent arbitration agreements
concerning the same subject matter. Therefore, the arbitration agreement they
made following the custody suit was void ab initio.
92
In Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima ,'9 the court held
that pursuit of a legal remedy in an independent action regarding a separate
dispute based on the same relationship did not result in a waiver. Forest City
Dillon, general contractor for development of a shopping mall, filed a demand
for arbitration of a dispute with one of its subcontractors. Thereafter, the sub-
contractor filed a complaint against Forest City Dillon in Superior Court. For-
est City Dillon responded with an application for a stay pending arbitration
and an order compelling arbitration. The subcontractor asserted that Forest
City Dillon had waived the right to arbitrate by prosecuting a cross-claim
against the subcontractor in an independent action based on the same pro-
ject. 94 The court rejected this argument, noting that the contractor had "con-
tinuously insisted upon arbitration of any dispute arising out of its subcontract
with respondent." 95
C. Dilatory Conduct
In Gold Coast Mall v. Larmar Corp.,96 the court held that a party does
not waive the right to arbitrate by failing to timely initiate arbitration if it is
under no obligation to do so. A dispute arose between Gold Coast Mall, as
tenant, and Lamar, as landlord, over rent owed under their lease agreement.
Lamar brought suit against Gold Coast, who filed a motion to compel arbitra-
tion. Lamar asserted that Gold Coast waived its right to compel arbitration by
failing to timely appoint an arbitrator as required by their agreement. 97 The
court rejected this argument, ruling that where the agreement did not specify
who was to initiate arbitration, that burden rested with the party asserting a
91. Id.
92. In so ruling, the court stated: "Once a civil action has been filed and is
pending, it is too late to enter into an agreement to arbitrate." id. at _ , 314 S.E.2d
at 278.
93. 138 Ariz. 410, 675 P.2d 296 (1984).
94. Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 298.
95. Id. at , 675 P.2d at 299. In holding that conduct "in a completely
independent action" did not result in waiver, the court noted that "no waiver can be
inferred from either concurrent pursuit of a remedy other than arbitration or from the
breach of any other provision of a contract without first asking for arbitration concern-
ing the parties' rights under that provision." The court also held that the presence of
additional parties to the dispute who had no contract with the general contractor was
not a sufficient reason to deny arbitration. Id.
96. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
97. Id. at 100, 468 A.2d at 93.
1985]
13
et al.: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
claim.9" Further, the court stated that since the party against whom a claim
was asserted did not have an obligation to commence arbitration, that party
did not waive the right to arbitrate by failing to appoint an arbitrator. 99
Public policy favors arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.100 Con-
sequently, courts are reluctant to find a waiver absent a clear indication of an
intent to waive.' 0 1 The Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled that no waiver
occurs where a party seeks legal relief for a dispute different from the one in
issue but arising from same relationship. 0 2 This apparently conflicts with a
ruling by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina that the utilization of a
legal remedy not only results in waiver of the parties' rights to arbitrate under
their previous agreement, but also prevents them from entering into a new
arbitration agreement.10 3 The better view is that the party utilizing litigation
to settle a dispute is in default of the agreement and waives the right to com-
pel arbitration as to any dispute arising under that agreement." 4 Otherwise, a
party would be able to pick and choose those disputes which it would be to his
advantage to litigate and those which it would be better to arbitrate, thereby
weakening the effectiveness of an arbitration agreement to enforce the public
policy favoring arbitration.
IV. ARBITRABILITY
When a party seeks to compel arbitration, or affirm an award, adverse
parties may contest the arbitrability of the claim. Generally, the language of
the parties' agreement determines the arbitrability of an issue. Courts follow
several recognized principles in determining the scope of arbitrability afforded
parties by the language of their agreement: (1) legislative intent is to refer a
dispute to arbitration when the issue is reasonably interpreted as arbitrable
unless there is positive assurance that the disputed issue was not within the
scope of the agreement; (2) broad arbitration clauses are to be interpreted to
favor arbitration; (3) public interest in prosecution of private anti-trust actions
militates against the policy encouraging arbitration of disputes; and (4) a pol-
icy encouraging arbitration requires the severing of non-arbitrable issues and
their independent adjudication if necessary to preserve the right to arbitrate.
Some courts hold that the court shall initially determine arbitrability, others
refer the question to the arbitration panel.
98. Id. at 109, 468 A.2d at 98.
99. Id. at 113, 468 A.2d at 100.
100. Forest City, 138 Ariz. at _ , 675 P.2d at 298.
101. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 109, 468 A.2d at 98.
102. Forest City, 138 Ariz. at ., 675 P.2d 299.
103. Rustad, 68 N.C. App. at __, 314 S.E.2d at 277-78.
104. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 110, 468 A.2d at 99.
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A. Scope of Contract
In Cloquet Education Association v. Independent School District No.
94,105 the court employed a "reasonably debatable" test to determine whether
an issue is arbitrable. If the application of the agreement to arbitrate the dis-
puted issue is reasonably debatable, the question should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. 10 6 Teachers contended that chaperone duties at school functions
were within the definition of terms and conditions of employment and were
arbitrable under their contract. The school district contended such assign-
ments were not only shielded from arbitration by inherent managerial policy,
but were also excluded by the union contract and a state public employment
statute.107 The court held the issue arbitrable because it was debatable
whether out-of-class assignments were controlled by the arbitrable provi-
sions.108 In addition to the language of the agreement, the court found it sig-
nificant that the parties had previously treated such assignments as negotiable
bargaining issues.10 9
In Iowa City Community School District v. Iowa City Education Associ-
ation,110 the court stated even more strongly that issues are arbitrable unless
the contract language provides "positive assurance" that the dispute is not
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. " Teacher salary schedules
were expressly arbitrable under one provision of an employment contract and
were subject to denial for unsatisfactory performance. The school board
sought to vacate an arbitration award to a teacher, arguing that the definition
of unsatisfactory performance was reserved to the board exclusively under an-
other provision." 2 The court ruled that the arbitrator did not exceed his au-
thority in determining what constituted unsatisfactory performance within the
meaning of the contract." 3 The opinion also dismissed the board's contention
that public policy demanded reservation of that authority to elected officials,
reasoning that the state public employment statute expressed a policy
favorable to arbitration.""
In Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp."6 the court held that a generic
arbitration agreement included all disputes under the contract not specifically
and expressly excluded. 16 When the scope of an agreement under that stan-
105. 344 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1984).
106. Id. at 418.
107. Id. at 417.
108. Id. at 418-19.
109. Id. at 418.
110. 343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1983).
Ill. Id. at 141.
112. Id. at 141-42.
113. Id. at 145.
114. Id.
115. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
116. Id. at 104, 468 A.2d at 95.
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dard is unclear, the question of substantive arbitrability is left to the arbitra-
tor. 1 7 At issue in the case was the interpretation of a percentage rental claim
in a commercial lease. One clause of the lease provided for arbitration of "any
and all disputes arising out of the contract," initiated by either party if negoti-
ations failed. When the tenant sought to compel arbitration thereunder, the
landlord contended that another provision reserved his right to use legal pro-
cess of re-entry for rental non-payment. The landlord pointed to a provision
stating that nothing in the contract would prevent his exercise of his re-entry
right. 1 8 The court held the arbitration clause controlling, reversing a lower
court ruling that had given the landlord an option to arbitrate under the
agreement."'
In Havens v. Safeway Stores'20 the court declined to order arbitration
where the agreement did not track the language of Kansas' version of UAA
section 1.1"2 The court stated that it could not imply additional terms where
the arbitration agreement is complete and unambiguous. 2 Havens involved a
sub-contractor suing his general contractor for payment for work performed.
The parties disputed the interpretation of a method of payment clause. The
court found that the language of the agreement, which referred to arbitration
all disputes "subject to arbitration under this contract," was significantly dif-
ferent than the language of UAA section 1, which referred to "any contro-
versy." ' 23 The court found that the parties intended only that disputes ex-
pressly arbitrable were included. None of the provisions specifying arbitrable
issues included interpretation of the payment clause; consequently, the general
contractor was not entitled to arbitration.'24
In Keller v. Health Management Foundation,2 5 the court stated that
where no substantial issue exists regarding the making of the arbitration
agreement, disputes must be arbitrated.'26 The plaintiff architect made a
claim against the defendant for payment. The defendant moved for dismissal
or stay pending arbitration. The lower court decided that since the defendant
did not file an answer to the complaint, no dispute existed and, therefore, it
denied arbitration.2 7 In reversing, the appellate court reasoned that the arbi-
tration clause made the dispute arbitrable. Since the plaintiff was suing on the
contract, no issue as to its making was raised. Therefore, the arbitration provi-
sion must be enforced, regardless of the otherwise justiciable nature of the
117. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97.
118. Id. at 102-03, 468 A.2d at 93-95.
119. Id. at 115, 468 A.2d at 101.
120. 235 Kan. 226, 678 P.2d 625 (1984).
121. Id. at __, 678 P.2d at 628-29.
122. Id. at , 678 P.2d at 630.
123. Id. at __, 678 P.2d at 628.
124. Id. at __, 678 P.2d at 628-29.
125. 438 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
126. Id. at 1077.
127. Id. at 1076.
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The court in Moseley v. Brewer 29 stated that the language of an arbitra-
tion agreement must be read broadly and given its most reasonable interpreta-
tion.130 Attorneys submitted to the arbitrator alternative amounts claimed due
in a dispute over division of fees. The arbitrator awarded neither of the
amounts submitted, but arrived at his own figures by interpreting the con-
tract's procedures for determining fees.13' Upholding the award, the court
stated that in the absence of an express limitation in the submission, the arbi-
trator's award was within the scope of the issue presented.1
3 2
In Logan & Clark, Inc. v. Adaptable Development Inc.,' 3 ' the court de-
clined to interpret a submission agreement as including a quantum meruit the-
ory of recovery not expressly included. 34 The agreement established a bifur-
cated hearing on the issues of liability and damages in a construction contract
dispute. No mention of quantum meruit was made in the submission, which
alleged breach of contract for which the subcontractor sought recovery. In the
first phase, the panel found the subcontractor in material breach and without
contract damages. Since the general contractor asserted no counterclaim, the
panel dismissed.'3 5 In contesting the validity of the award for exceeding the
scope of the submission agreement, the subcontractor argued that it had a
quantum meruit claim reserved for phase two, and that the panel had prema-
turely dismissed the claim in phase one. The court ruled that the clear intent
of the parties was to determine liability in phase one, regardless of the theory
of liability. It therefore declined to presume that a quantum meruit theory was
implicitly reserved for phase two.'36
In Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp.,' 37 the Illinois Supreme Court was called
upon to determine exactly how broadly an arbitration agreement should be
construed. The plaintiff argued that since a stock purchase agreement con-
tained an arbitration clause which named an accounting firm as arbitrator, the
provision applied only to technical disputes in the agreement." a In rejecting
this argument, the court relied on section 1 of the UAA and earlier Illinois
decisions holding that arbitration agreements were to be read as broadly as
possible.'39 The court stayed the plaintiff's action for breach of contract be-
128. Id. at 1077.
129. 139 Ariz. 540, 679 P.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1984).
130. Id. at ., 679 P.2d at 565.
131. Id. at __,679 P.2d at 564.
132. Id. at __, 679 P.2d at 565.
133. 450 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
134. Id. at 1191.
135. Id. at 1190.
136. Id. at 1190-91.
137. 98 Ill. 2d 268, 456 N.E.2d 93 (1983).
138. Id. at 273, 456 N.E.2d at 95.
139. Id. at 274, 456 N.E.2d at 96 (citing Security Mutual Casualty v. Harbor
Ins. Co., 77 Ill. 2d 446, 449, 397 N.E.2d 839, 841 (1979), which quoted Ross v. Watt,
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cause the provisions that "any such claim or claims" in dispute be settled by
arbitration included the claim involving payment of problem loans. 4 °
In Rentar Industries, Inc. v. Rubenstein, 4 ' defendant entered into a five-
year employment contract with plaintiff. The agreement required the parties
to submit to arbitration "disputes over any provision of the agreement."' 42 De-
fendant was discharged and subsequently sought to compel arbitration. Plain-
tiff claimed that since the issue of termination was not mentioned in the con-
tract, it was not subject to arbitration. The court held that the issue of
termination was subject to arbitration since the subject matter of the dispute
involved the contract provision establishing the five-year term of
employment. 14 3
B. Proper Forum for Determining Arbitrability
In Board of Education, North Palos Elementary School District No. 117
v. Williams,14 4 the court held that when the scope of the agreement is reasona-
bly in doubt arbitrability is decided by the court. 4 5 Teachers sought arbitra-
tion of a grievance concerning the assignment of extra classroom duties to
substitute teachers. The board of education moved for and received a stay of
arbitration, contending that the right to make teaching assignments was re-
served in their collective bargaining agreement with the teacher's union as
non-arbitrable.' 6 The appellate court reversed the stay of arbitration order,
finding that the classroom assignments procedure was an arbitrable issue, al-
though the right to make such assignments was non-delegable under the re-
served authority proviso.' 47
In contrast to the general rule, the court in Farm Family Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Blevins148 stated that an arbitrator, not a court, should determine
initially whether a dispute is arbitrable. 49 Defendant insured wished to collect
for uninsured driver loss under three policies he held with the plaintiff. The
company sought a declaratory judgement of nonliability, since stacking of pol-
icy claims was prohibited by Delaware law. Defendant resided in Delaware,
whereas the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, which permits stacking of
claims. 5 ' The court ruled that the defendant was entitled to arbitration. It
16 Ill. 99, 102 (1854)).
140. Id. at __ , 456 N.E.2d at 95 (1983).
141. 118 Ill. App. 3d 1, 454 N.E.2d 752 (1983).
142. Id. at 2, 454 N.E.2d at 753.
143. Id. at 3, 454 N.E.2d at 754.
144. 118 111. App. 3d 256, 454 N.E.2d 773 (1983).
145. Id. at 263, 454 N.E.2d at 778.
146. Id. at 262, 454 N.E.2d at 775-77.
147. Id. at 266-67, 454 N.E.2d at 779-80.
148. 572 F. Supp. 397 (D. Del. 1983).
149. Id. at 401.
150. Id. at 398-400.
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reasoned that eligibility for damages, and the amount thereof, are arbitrable
under the agreement. If determining eligibility requires the arbitrator to deter-
mine the controlling state law, it is within the scope of his authority by express
contract. 151
In accordance with the general rule, J & K Cement Construction v.
Montalbano Builders"' ruled that the arbitrability of a dispute is determined
by the court, according to the same rules of construction as any other con-
tract-by construing the wording of the arbitration clause and the terms of
the entire contract. 5 3 The court stated that a broad generic arbitration clause
which does not enumerate specific arbitrable issues evinces a clear intent of
the parties to arbitrate all issues arising out of the contract. 5 1 When an owner
sued for damages resulting from delays in building his house, defendant con-
tractor sought to compel arbitration. The court found the clause encompassing
all claims "arising out of, or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof"
sufficiently broad to include damages for delay. 55 Moreover, the court ruled
that a count in fraud was also arbitrable, since the claimed fraud concerned
the contract as a whole rather than an agreement to arbitrate. 15
In Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Maurizio,151 the
court noted that in determining the question of arbitrability, trial courts are to
avoid ruling on the substantive provisions of a contract. The court refused to
rule on an anti-stacking provision in an insurance contract because it thought
that to do so would encroach on the merits of the case. 5 8
C. Arbitrability of Specific Claims
In Sabates v. International Medical Centers, Inc.,15 1 the court declined to
construe a generic arbitration clause broadly enough to encompass state anti-
trust claims. 6 0 The plaintiff doctor filed breach of contract, civil theft, and
antitrust claims against defendant hospital. The disputed contract language
called for arbitration of all disputes and claims arising in connection with the
agreement. The court affirmed compulsory arbitration on the civil theft and
breach of contract claims, but reversed the order of arbitration on the antitrust
issue.' 6' It reasoned that the policy underlying the private right to antitrust
actions was to promote vigorous prosecution. Furthermore, the policy favoring
151. Id. at 400-01.
152. 119 Ill. App. 3d 663, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983).
153. Id. at 670-71, 456 N.E.2d at 894-95.
154. Id. at 671, 456 N.E.2d at 895.
155. Id. at 671, 456 N.E.2d at 894-95.
156. Id. at 671-72, 456 N.E.2d at 896.
157. 129 Mich. App. 166, 176, 341 N.W.2d 262, 267 (1983).
158. Id. at 176-77, 341 N.W.2d at 268.
159. 450 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
160. Id. at 517-18.
161. Id. at 517-19.
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arbitrated settlement must give way to the interest of the public in enforcing
antitrust statutes. Arbitrators selected for business acumen and not bound by
rules of law are inadequate to administer antitrust issues.'62
D. Severability of Claims
Sabates6 3 also addressed the issue of severability of claims. If a non-
arbitrable claim will necessarily survive any decision in arbitration on the
other issues, it need not be stayed pending results of the arbitration. 64 Thus,
plaintiff's antitrust complaint was independent of his other complaints, and
could be ordered to trial.
In Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima,' the court also
considered the severability of non-arbitrable claims. The Dillon court stated
that piecemeal resolution of a party's claims against multiple opponents is nec-
essary where not all of the claims are arbitrable 66 The general contractor on
a construction project sought arbitration against a subcontractor. The defen-
dant contended, inter alia, that arbitration could not be successfully completed
because he had brought actions against co-defendants who were not parties to
the contract to arbitrate. The court ruled that the arbitration agreement was
enforceable regardless of third party defendants who might be liable to defen-
dant for contribution or indemnity. If the subcontractor was found liable to
the general in arbitration, the subcontractor could still pursue his claims
against the cross-defendants in litigation.16 7
Generally, courts interpret arbitration clauses broadly, referring disputes
to arbitration unless the agreement clearly indicates that the disputed issue
was not within the scope of the arbitration clause. The issue of arbitrability is
generally decided by the court according to contract rules of construction.
Where the public has an interest in certain disputes being litigated, such as
antitrust claims, courts will not enforce arbitration clauses encompassing such
claims. When non-arbitrable issues are involved, courts will sever those issues
and order arbitration of the remaining arbitrable claims.
V. PROCEEDINGS To COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
A. Compelling Arbitration
Arbitration agreements are statutorily recognized contracts and are sub-
ject to judicial enforcement by a petition to compel arbitration. Thus, an order
to compel arbitration is equivalent to an order for specific performance of the
162. Id. at 517.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 519.
165. 138 Ariz. 410, 675 P.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1984).
166. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 299.
167. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 298-99.
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arbitration agreement. 6 8 Under the UAA, a party may compel arbitration by
showing both an agreement to arbitrate and the opposing party's refusal to
arbitrate.6'6 Compelling arbitration is a function of the court, not the arbitra-
tor who does not have the power to determine his own jurisdiction. 70 Thus,
the purpose of compelling arbitration is to provide a judicial safeguard neces-
sary to insure that arbitration is the proper manner to settle the underlying
dispute.' 7'
When a petition to compel arbitration is filed, the court's role is to make
a threshold determination of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists between
the parties and whether such agreement includes arbitration of the specific
point in dispute. 7 1 If the court finds a valid agreement which covers the dis-
pute, arbitration will be compelled. In answering these threshold questions, the
court will usually interpret both the arbitration agreement and the applicable
state arbitration statutes. The goal is to ascertain the parties' intent with re-
spect to arbitration. Accordingly, the only question that the aforementioned
threshold test addresses is whether the dispute is arbitrable. Therefore, courts
should not make substantive decisions on the merits of the dispute.
1. Jurisdiction
A court's power to compel arbitration is determined by statute. 17  For
example, in Architects Collaborative, Inc. v. Bates College,7 " the Federal Dis-
trict Court of Maine was required to interpret Massachusetts' arbitration stat-
ute'75 to determine whether a Maine court would have the power to compel
arbitration. Architects involved a building contract between an architect and
the owner of the building.'76 The building was to be built in Maine and the
168. Pettinaro Const. Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 3r. & Sons, Inc., 408 A.2d 957, 962
(Del. Ch. 1979).
169. UAA § 2(a) provides:
On application of a party showing an agreement described in Section 1
[an arbitration agreement], and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the
Court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing
party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the Court shall pro-
ceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order
arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise the application shall be
denied.
170. Westbrook School Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d 204, 207
(Me. 1979).
171. Unif. Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955).
172. City of Wamego v. L.R. Foy Const. Co., Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 168,
675 P.2d 912, 915 (1984).
173. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Maurizo, 129 Mich. App. 166, 175, 341
N.W.2d 262, 265 (1983).
174. 576 F. Supp. 380 (D. Me. 1983).
175. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2 (West 1984).
176. 576 F. Supp. at 380.
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contract, which was to be governed by Massachusetts law, 77 contained an ar-
bitration provision. 1 7 After the architect rendered his services, the owner com-
plained that the building was defectively designed and filed suit in Maine Su-
perior Court.1 79 The architect then sought to compel arbitration but the owner
resisted, claiming that the Maine court lacked jurisdiction to compel arbitra-
tion because jurisdiction had been exclusively reserved for the courts of Mas-
sachusetts by agreement of the parties.8 0 The court held, however, that it was
not deprived of jurisdiction18 because the Massachusetts statute 82 only per-
mitted the action to be brought in state court, and because it did not otherwise
display an intent to limit the forums from which a party could seek relief.1 83
2. Notice
A petition to arbitrate must be served to the opposing party before a court
can compel arbitration. 8" By signing a contract containing an arbitration pro-
vision, a party does not waive the right to notice of the proceedings to compel
arbitration. 85 Notice is governed by section 16 of the UAA, 88 and is gener-
ally provided by the application to compel arbitration. Since the application is
normally the "initial application" made to a court, the application "shall be
served in the manner provided by law for the service of summons in an
action."18 7
177. The parties had agreed Massachusetts law would govern. Id. at 381.
178. The provision provided that all disputes "shall be decided by arbitration in
accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise." Id.
179. Id. at 380.
180. Id. at 381.
181. Id. at 382-83.
182. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2(a) (West Supp. 1984).
183. 576 F. Supp. at 382. In part the Massachusetts arbitration provision states:
"A party . . . may apply to the superior court [of Massachusetts] for an order di-
recting the parties to proceed to arbitration . . ." (emphasis supplied). MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2(a) (West Supp. 1984). The court held that the word "may" in
the statute allowed arbitration in either state. 576 F. Supp. at 382.
184. Cassidy v. Keystone Ins. Co., 322 Pa. Super. 168, -, 469 A.2d 236, 239
(1983).
185. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 41 (1975).
186. UAA § 16 provides:
Except as otherwise provided, an application to the court under this act
shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice
provided by law or rule of court for the making and hearing of motions. Un-
less the parties have agreed otherwise, notice of an initial application for an
order shall be served in the manner provided by law for the service of sum-
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In Cassidy v. Keystone Ins. Co.'8 the court recognized that a court order
compelling arbitration must be vacated if the opposing party was not served in
the manner prescribed by law. The insurance company sought to strike the
arbitrator's award, 8 9 claiming that it had not been given sufficient notice of
the arbitration hearing and that, therefore, it was not bound by the award
given at the hearing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the insur-
ance company and struck down the award. Cassidy demonstrates that an op-
posing party must be given notice before a motion to compel arbitration, or
any other type of arbitration proceeding,' can be heard.
3. Party Determination
As a general rule, a court may only compel arbitration between the par-
ties to the arbitration agreement.' 91 On its face, this appears to be a simple
determination; however, as Computer Corp. of America v. Zarecor192 demon-
strates, the problem becomes more complex when potential parties have acted
in different capacities. In Zarecor, Computer Corporation of America (CCA)
granted to European Market Consultants (EMC), a purported business entity,
an exclusive license to distribute its software.1 93 The contract was negotiated
for EMC by Copeland and Zarecor, both of whom were defendants in this
action. The contract was executed in the respective corporate names."9 Cope-
land signed as "president" of EMC but Zarecor did not sign the contract in
any capacity. The contract contained an arbitration provision.' 95 After EMC
failed to pay a license fee, CCA brought an action against Copeland and
Zarecor. CCA alleged that EMC had not been formed or capitalized and that
both defendants were liable by acting together as joint venturers. In their an-
swers, both defendants sought unsuccessfully to compel arbitration. Copeland
then appealed this ruling.'
188. 322 Pa. Super. 168, 469 A.2d 236 (Ct. 1983).
189. Id. at __ , 469 A.2d at 236.
190. Cassidy involved a petition to appoint an arbitrator but the court implicitly
recognized that a petition to appoint an arbitrator encompasses a petition to compel
arbitration when filed as the initial appearance before a court since there is no purpose
in such an appointment unless the parties are also compelled to arbitrate. Id. at 239.
191. Computer Corp. of Am. v. Zarecor, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 452 N.E.2d
267, 269 (1983), appeal denied 390 Mass. 1103, 454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at _ , 452 N.E.2d at 268.
195. Id. Section 17(a) of the contract was a provision which related to arbitra-
tion and stated in part: "All disputes ... which may argue between the parties hereto
out of or in relation to or in connection with this Agreement, shall be finally settled in
arbitration ... The decision of such arbitration shall be binding on both parties." Id. at
268, n. 2.
196. Id. Apparently Zarecor did not appeal because his case for compelling arbi-
tration was much weaker than Copeland's since Zarecor did not sign the contract. See
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The Massachusetts Appellate Court noted that the contract contained no
clear indication that either Copeland or Zarecor should be considered parties
to the agreement. 97 The contract was executed between two "corporations."
Copeland's signature, as "president," indicated that only EMC was intended
to be bound by the contract's terms. Further, both Copeland and Zarecor de-
nied they were liable under the executed contract. 9 8 The court recognized
that Copeland's repudiation and abandonment of the contract was wholly in-
consistent with his attempt to compel arbitration. Thus, the court refused to
allow Copeland to be a party for purposes of compelling arbitration since he
would deny being a party to the contract as a defense in arbitration. 99
4. Contract Determination
The most fundamental issue before a court asked to compel arbitration is
whether the parties are bound to the contract.' 00 As stated by the court in
Wamego v. L.R. Foy Construction Co., Inc., ° ' if there is no valid agreement
between the parties, compelling arbitration is not proper. Defendant subcon-
tractor's bid was conditionally accepted by the City (plaintiff).O A dispute
arose over whether the subcontractor had received final written notice of the
award within the time necessary to formally award the contract. The subcon-
tractor claimed that he was not bound to the contract because this time had
expired before he received written notice.203 The subcontractor refused to com-
mence work and the City brought suit for breach of contract. In response, the
subcontractor filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the contract. 20 4
Thus, the subcontractor inconsistently argued for the nonexistence of the con-
tract while seeking to compel arbitration according to its terms.
In affirming the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration, the Wamego
court reasoned that the existence of the arbitration agreement is dependent on
infra note 199.
197. 16 Mass. App. Ct. at -, 452 N.E.2d at 269.
198. Id. at __ , 452 N.E.2d at 270.
199. But see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 251 § 2(e) (West 1984) (This provision
from Massachusetts' arbitration act, which is identical to UAA § 2(e), forbids an order
for arbitration to be refused because the claim lacks merit or bona fides). One further
note on Zarecor. In dicta, the court reasoned that judicial economy would not be served
by compelling arbitration with respect to Copeland while permitting litigation against
Zarecor. 16 Mass. App. Ct. at , 452 N.E.2d at 270. Since Zarecor never signed
the contract it is almost certain that he was never intended to be a party. Furthermore,
allowing both litigation and arbitration to rule on the same dispute presents an unnec-
essary delay and expense.
200. North I1l. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 275 (1982).
201. 9 Kan. App. 2d 168, 675 P.2d 912 (1984).
202. Id. at _ , 675 P.2d at 913.
203. Id. at , 675 P.2d at 915.
204. Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 913.
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the underlying contract. Since the dispute questioned whether a contract was
ever executed, arbitration was not proper. Because he denied the initial con-
tractual obligation, the subcontractor was prevented from claiming the benefits
of the contractual provisions.2"
5. Contract Interpretation
In Havens v. Safeway Stores, 0 a subcontractor sued a general contrac-
tor after a dispute arose over method for payment. The general contractor
sought to compel arbitration relying on the parties' contract, which stated
that, "All disputes, claims, or questions subject to arbitration under this con-
tract shall be submitted to arbitration . . ." (emphasis added).2"' The Kansas
Supreme Court, however, refused to compel arbitration because, after examin-
ing the contract's other provisions, it concluded that the parties intended only
to arbitrate specific issues. Since the method of payment was not one of these
issues, the court would not compel arbitration.10
In Cloquet Education Association v. Independent School District No.
94,209 a dispute arose when Independent School District (ISD) assigned a
teacher to chaperone a dance. A union, representing the teacher, asserted that
such assignment constituted a change in the terms and conditions of the
teacher's employment and therefore required negotiation. ISD claimed that
the assignment was within its "inherent managerial policy" and, thus, ISD
had the right to make such assignment despite the fact that it was against the
teacher's will. The parties' contract contained an arbitration clause which cov-
ered disputes involving changes in the terms and conditions of employment,
but did not cover changes in "inherent managerial policy."21 The union
sought to compel arbitration and ISD claimed the dispute was not within the
reach of the arbitration provision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the issue of whether to compel
arbitration is controlled by the intention of the parties as manifested in the
arbitration agreement. 211 The court set forth the following standard to be ap-
plied to petitions to compel arbitration:
(1) If the parties evinced a clear intent to arbitrate a controversy arising
out of specific provisions of the contract, the matter is for the arbitrators to
determine and not the court.
(2) If the intention of the parties is reasonably debatable as to the scope
of the arbitration clause, the issue of arbitrability is to be initially determined
205. Id. at __ , 675 P.2d at 916.
206. 235 Kan. 226, 678 P.2d 625 (1984).
207. Id. at __ , 678 P.2d at 628.
208. id.
209. 344 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1984).
210. Id. at 417.
211. Id. at 418.
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by the arbitrators subject to the rights of either party reserved under Minn.
Stat. 572.19 (3, 5) (1982).
(3) If no agreement to arbitrate exists, either in fact or because the con-
troversy sought to be arbitrated is not within the scope of the arbitration
clause of the contract, the court may interfere and protect a party from being
compelled to arbitrate. 212
According to the Cloquet court, requiring the teacher to chaperone
"clearly" came within the intended meaning of "terms and conditions of em-
ployment." Thus, the court compelled arbitration holding that this dispute fell
within the first standard mentioned above.2 1 3
In Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp.,21 4 the court applied the second
test set forth in Cloquet.21 5 The court interpreted a lease which provided that
disputes between the landlord and tenant which were not settled within sixty
days would be committed to arbitration. 2 6 However, another clause in the
lease allowed the landlord to use legal process for disputes involving payment
of rent. After a dispute arose between the tenant and the landlord,' t7 the land-
lord brought suit against the tenant.2"8 The tenant then sought to compel arbi-
tration. The court held that where there was disagreement over the applicabil-
ity of an arbitration provision and where the parties' intention as to the scope
of such provision is "reasonably debatable," the question of arbitrability is to
be determined initially by the arbitrator.1 9 Since it was "reasonably debata-
ble" whether the arbitration clause covered disputes involving payment of rent,
the court compelled arbitration.2 2 1
Adherence to the terms of the parties' contract is a major consideration
for the courts in compelling arbitration. In Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp.,221
where the contract allowed arbitration of "any objection to any claim," the
Illinois Supreme Court compelled full arbitration despite the claim that arbi-
tration was limited to the arbitrators' expertise.2 2 2 Notaro involved the sale of
bank stock. The seller (plaintiff) sought discharge from all contractual duties
due to a breach by the buyer (defendant). The buyer, in turn, sought to com-
212. Id. (it should be noted that this case law interpretation of the application of
a statute compelling arbitration strongly favors allowing arbitration, for even if no
agreement to arbitrate exists the court "may" still compel arbitration).
213. Id.
214. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
215. Supra note 212 and accompanying text.
216. 298 Md. at 101-02, 468 A.2d at 94.
217. The dispute was over interpretation of a contractual provision pertaining to
percentage payments made to the landlord. Id. at 100, 468 A.2d at 93.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97; see also supra note 205 and accompanying text.
220. 298 Md. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97.
221. 98 Ill. 2d 268, 456 N.E.2d 93 (1983).
222. Id. at 275, 456 N.E.2d at 97.
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pel arbitration under the arbitration provision in the contract.2 23 The court
decided that the arbitration provision did not limit arbitration solely to techni-
cal issues that were within the expertise of the certified public accountants
who were to serve as the arbitrators. Instead, the court interpreted the general
arbitration provision in the broad terms in which it was written.""
In Manalili v. Commercial Mowing & Grading,2 5 the court compelled
arbitration despite the claim that a condition precedent to the applicability of
the arbitration clause had not been met. 2 6 The defendant agreed to construct
a driveway on plaintiff's property. The parties' contract stipulated that if a
dispute arose, arbitration could not be demanded until there was a written
decision on the matter by the architect or until ten days after the evidence had
been presented to him. 227 The court ruled that this clause only established
time limits and was not a precondition to arbitration. Because the agreement
contained an arbitration clause and since there was an arbitrable issue, the
court compelled arbitration. 2 8
Rentar Industries, Inc. v. Rubenstein2 29 involved the interpretation of an
arbitration clause in an employment contract. The employer argued that the
dispute centered around termination of the employment and was not arbitrable
because the contract did not address termination. The court, however, com-
pelled arbitration holding that the termination of an employee prior to the
termination date set in the contract was subject to the contract's general arbi-
tration clause.2 30
The Indiana Court of Appeals, in State v. Van Ulzen 31 refused to com-
pel arbitration since the party seeking such relief did not meet the require-
ments of the parties' agreement.232 Van Ulzen involved a dispute between state
prison teachers and the state. After an administrative appeals board refused to
grant the teachers relief, they sought to compel arbitration. 33 The court held
that under the State Personnel Act, only "recommendations" of the State Em-
ployees Appeals Commission could be arbitrated.23 4 In this case, the Commis-
sion's finding was not a recommendation.235 Consequently, the teachers only
223. Id. at 270, 456 N.E.2d at 94.
224. Id. at 275, 456 N.E.2d at 97. The dissent in this case was not based on the
merits but on whether the denial of a motion to compel arbitration was appealable.
225. 442 So. 2d 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
226. Id. at 413.
227. Id. at 412.
228. Id. at 413.
229. 118 Ill. App. 3d 1, 454 N.E.2d 752 (1983).
230. Id. at 3, 454 N.E.2d at 753.
231. 456 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
232. 456 N.E.2d at 463.
233. 456 N.E.2d at 461.
234. 456 N.E.2d at 463.
235. The Commission decided that the teachers failed to make a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Id.
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remedy was to file a timely petition to have the court review the Commission's
order. 23 6
Courts' jurisdiction to compel arbitration is derived from statutes. Before
a court can compel arbitration, however, notice of the hearing must be given
to the opposing party. Only parties can compel arbitration; but, if there is no
valid arbitration agreement between the parties, compelling arbitration is not
proper. Courts generally construe arbitration clauses broadly, compelling arbi-
tration unless it is clear that the arbitration clause does not cover the dispute.
B. Staying Court Proceedings
When the subject matter of a pending lawsuit includes an arbitrable is-
sue, a motion to compel arbitration is proper." 7 If the motion is granted, the
court's order must include a stay of the court proceedings.238 The stay may be
made only with respect to the arbitrable issue if that issue is severable from
the other issues in the case. 3 9
In Blow v. Shaughnessy,240 the court refused to stay litigation concerning
a securities matter because there was not a valid arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties. Investors had, as part of a limited partnership, invested
money with a broker who then entered into agreements, containing arbitration
clauses with several major brokerage firms. The court held that, because of
non-compliance with statutory requirements governing the creation of a part-
nership, the investors were not bound by the arbitration clauses in the agree-
ments signed by the broker. 4"
In Walter L. Keller & Associates v. Health Management Foundation,1
42
the court stayed litigation proceedings because a party sought damages for the
breach of a contract containing an arbitration clause. 24 3 Keller and Health
Management Foundation (HMF) were co-defendants in a lawsuit. Keller
cross-claimed against HMF, alleging a contract and refusal to pay for services
provided according to its terms. In support of its motion to stay the arbitra-
tion, Keller cited a case involving similar facts in another district of the Flor-
236. Id.
237. UAA § 2(a), supra note 169.
238. UAA § 2(d) provides:
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall
be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made
under this section or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect
thereto only. When the application is made in such action or proceeding, the
order for arbitration shall include such stay.
239. Id.
240. 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868 (1984).
241. Id at -, 313 S.E.2d at 880.
242. 438 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
243. Id. at 1077.
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ida District Court of Appeals, 44 which had held that there was not an arbitra-
ble issue until an answer to the complaint had been filed.2 14 Disagreeing with
the other district, the court in Keller held that because there was neither an
issue as to the existence of the contract nor the arbitration provision, the trial
court was correct in finding that the Florida statute paralleling UAA section
2(a)24 0 applied. Accordingly, the court stayed the litigation and compelled
arbitration.2 4
7
In two recent cases, J & K Cement Construction v. Montalbano Build-
ers248 and Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima,249 courts en-
forced arbitration agreements even though enforcement required staying court
proceedings involving parties not covered by the arbitration agreements. In
J & K Cement, a landowner entered into a contract with a general contractor
to build a home. The contract contained an arbitration clause. The general
contractor subsequently entered into contracts with subcontractors to do the
work. None of these contracts contained arbitration clauses. After a dispute
arose, the subcontractors filed suit against the general contractor and the
owner. The owner counterclaimed against the general contractor, who then
moved to compel arbitration and for a stay of the court proceedings. The court
consolidated all of the parties' claims and compelled arbitration, and also or-
dered a stay of the court proceedings. The appellate court, in reaching its con-
clusion, rejected the following arguments: concern for judicial economy; dupli-
cation of proof; and the potential for inconsistent results. 250 Instead, the court
relied on the Illinois policy favoring arbitration as a method of dispute resolu-
tion and the enactment of the UAA by the legislature as evidencing an intent
that arbitration not be enjoined to prevent a multiplicity of actions.2 51
In Forest City, the general contractor for construction of a mall con-
tracted with a subcontractor. The contract contained an arbitration clause.
The subcontractor then contracted with several other parties. The general con-
tractor moved to arbitrate a dispute with the subcontractor. The subcontractor
then filed an action in superior court against the general contractor and the
parties he had subcontracted with. The general contractor filed a motion to
stay the court proceeding and to compel arbitration.2 52 In granting the motion,
the Arizona Court of Appeals cited the public policy favoring arbitration as a
means of resolving disputes. 5 ' The court indicated a willingness to resort to
244. Mills v. Robert W. Gottfried, Inc., 272 So. 2d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
245. Keller, 438 So. 2d at 1076.
246. Supra note 169.
247. Keller, 438 So. 2d at 1077.
248. 119 III. App. 3d 663, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983).
249. 138 Ariz. 410, 675 P.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1984).
250. J. & K. Cement, 119 Ii. App. 3d at 675-76, 456 N.E.2d at 889.
251. Id. at 681, 456 N.E.2d at 902.
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piecemeal litigation if necessary to enforce an arbitration agreement. The fact
that other parties might eventually be liable to the subcontractor was no rea-
son to invalidate the arbitration agreement. 5
4
Generally, if a motion to compel arbitration is granted, the court will
order a stay of litigation. Enforcement of arbitration agreements may require
staying court proceedings involving parties not covered by such agreements.
VI. AWARDS
The UAA contains six sections which deal specifically with awards. These
sections set forth guidelines and procedures concerning delivering, confirming,
vacating, and modifying or correcting an award.155 The courts use these guide-
lines to determine whether judicial intervention is warranted.
Courts' deference to the arbitrator's decision underscores the basic tenets
of the arbitration process-the informal, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of
disputes. 56 Stressing that arbitration awards are independent and separate
from judicial proceedings 5 ' and the need for certainty and finality, 5 8 courts
generally uphold awards even if an error of fact or law was made.259 The
courts often recognize the arbitrator's superior position for making fair deter-
minations6 0 and give every reasonable presumption to the arbitrator's decision
unless there is a finding that the arbitrator clearly exceeded the scope of the
arbitration agreement. 26 1
A. Awards Based on Errors of Law or Fact
Generally, errors of law or fact made by arbitrators will not justify vacat-
ing an arbitration award. In Wicomico County Education Association v.
Board of Education,262 the court stated that an arbitration award can be set
aside for errors of fact by an arbitrator only when those errors give rise to
254. Id. at __ , 675 P.2d at 299.
255. UAA §§ 8, 9, 11-14.
256. See e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Stariha, 346 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
257. See e.g., National Indem. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d
748 (Minn. 1984).
258. See Eisen v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 352 N.W,2d 731 (Minn. 1984).
259. See e.g., Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Carmen's Union, Div.
589, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 455 N.E.2d 1231 (1983), appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1106,
459 N.E.2d 824 (1984); contra, Plymouth-Carver Regional School Dist. v. David M.
Crawley Assocs., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 455 N.E.2d 990 (1983).
260. See National Indem. Co., 348 N.W.2d at 752.
261. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 17 Mass. App. Ct. at -, 455
N.E.2d at 1234.
262. 59 Md. App. 564, 477 A.2d 279 (1984).
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grounds sufficient under the UAA to vacate an award.263 A teacher and his
union petitioned to vacate an arbitration award which declined to install the
teacher as a baseball coach. The teacher and union contended that the arbitra-
tor erred in finding that there was more than one applicant for the coaching
position. Petitioners did not make a transcript of the arbitration proceeding
and, therefore, could not provide a transcript to the court.2 6 ' The court stated
that without a transcript of the arbitration proceeding it could not determine
whether the arbitrator erred in his fact finding, much less determine whether
any factual error gave rise to a statutory claim for vacation of the award.
26 5
In a dispute between the Massachusetts Transportation Authority and the
Carmen's Union, the court in Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v.
Boston Carmen's Union, Division 58926 6 ruled that an arbitrator's award
should be upheld even if after reinspection the award is erroneous in fact or
law.21 7 The transportation authority contracted with a non-profit corporation
to provide bus services for the elderly and handicapped. The arbitrator deter-
mined that the employees of the new service were employees of the transporta-
tion authority for labor relations purposes. The court found the arbitrator had
not exceeded his scope of authority by making this determination. 26 8 The au-
thority further argued that the arbitrator's finding was outside the scope out-
lined by the "issue." In response, the court stated that an award may be ex-
tended by consent. In this instance "consent" was inferred by "mutual
acquiesence" because of the transportation authority's failure to make a timely
protest to the extension.
2 69
In Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges,2 10 the court ad-
dressed whether a mistake of law by arbitrators constitutes an act in excess of
their powers.2 7 1 Western installed a soccer field which Lindenwood claimed
was defective. The arbitrator found that the defective condition of the field
was predominately caused by Western, but that Lindenwood was partially re-
sponsible. Western asserted that since the arbitrators found Lindenwood guilty
of contributory negligence,27 2 the arbitrators exceeded their powers and exhib-
ited a "manifest disregard of the law" in granting the award. 27 1 The court
263. Id. at 568, 477 A.2d at 281.
264. Id. at 566, 477 A.2d at 280.
265. Id. at 570, 477 A.2d at 282.
266. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 455 N.E.2d 1231 (1983), appeal denied, 390 Mass.
1106, 459 N.E.2d 824 (1984).
267. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1234.
268. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1235.
269. Id.
270. 662 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
271. Id. at 291.
272. When this case was decided contributory negligence was a complete bar for
breach of implied warranty. Missouri has now adopted comparative fault. See Gustaf-
son v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
273. Lindenwood, 662 S.W.2d at 290.
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held, however, that erroneous interpretations of law do not constitute an excess
of power,27 4 and, to establish a manifest disregard of the law, it must be shown
that the arbitrator understood and correctly stated the law but ignored it.2 75
In contrast to the general rule, in Plymouth-Carver Regional School Dis-
trict v. David M. Crawley Associates, 27 the court ruled that arbitrators had
exceeded their authority in rendering an award that violated municipal finance
laws.17 7 The towns in the school district had voted substantial sums to con-
struct a high school, but had placed specific limits on amounts authorized and
had refused to vote supplemental appropriations. The regional school commit-
tee voted to use a surplus revenue account to pay for additional costs and
made payments from this fund until abandoning the project. Crawley Associ-
ates filed a demand for arbitration under the contract for additional costs and
was awarded $58,637 by the arbitrators. The court decided that to use this
fund to pay the award would circumvent the towns' veto power provided by
statute2 78 and affirmed the judgment vacating the award. 279
In National Indemnity Co. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,280 the
court ruled that even though the jury found that the plaintiff sustained no
damage in a negligence suit, the arbitrator's subsequent indemnification award
should be upheld. 281 Southwest Cab Company was responsible for an accident.
National, its insurer, was required to reimburse Farm Bureau for a $10,000
no-fault insurance claim paid to the other motorist despite the fact that the
jury found he had suffered no injuries.28 2 In upholding the award, the court
recognized two general principles: first, that arbitration is independent from
judicial fact-finding; and second, that allowing a jury to be conclusive on an
arbitrator's decision encourages litigation since it may provide the basis for a
different result. 283
B. Modification of Awards
Modification or correction of awards is governed by section 9284 and sec-
274. Id. at 291-92.
275. Id. at 292.
276. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 455 N.E.2d 990 (1983).
277. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 991.
278. Id.
279. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 992.
280. 348 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1984).
281. Id. at 749.
292. Id. at 749-50.
283. Id. at 751.
284. UAA § 9 states:
On application of a party or, if an application to the court is pending
under Sections 11, 12 or 13, on submission to the arbitrators by the court
under such conditions as the court may order, the arbitrators may modify or
correct the award upon the grounds stated in paragraphs (1) and (3) of sub-
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tion 13285 of the UAA. A court applied these principles in Minnesota Licensed
Practical Nurses Association v. Bemidji Clinic,2 8 6 where the statutory require-
ments for modification of an award were strictly enforced.2"" Nelson, a part-
time nurse, was replaced by a full-time nurse with less seniority. Nelson then
requested reinstatement and back pay in accordance with the collective bar-
gaining agreement. At arbitration the arbitrator established a procedure for
handling lay-offs of full and part-time employees. 28 8 A year later, Nelson sued
for enforcement of the arbitration award asking for back pay and full-time
employment pursuant to the arbitration award. The court first decided that
Nelson was asking for a modification rather than an enforcement since the
award did not specifically grant back pay. s9 Under the Minnesota statute,
2 90
application for modification must be made within ninety days after delivery of
a copy of the award. 29' Regarding her request for full-time employment, the
court held that since the award did not specifically state that she must be
offered full-time employment, she was not entitled to it.
2 92
division (a) of Section 13, or for the purpose of clarifying the award. The
application shall be made within twenty days after delivery of the award to
the applicant. Written notice thereof shall be given forthwith to the opposing
party, stating he must serve his objections thereto, if any, within ten days
from the notice. The award so modified or corrected is subject to the provi-
sions of Sections 11, 12 and 13.
285. UAA § 13 provides:
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of
the award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award where
(I) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them
and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision
upon the issues submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits
of the controversy.
(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the
award so as to effect its intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and
corrected. Otherwise, the court shall confirm the award as made.
(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the
alternative with an application to vacate the award.
286. 352 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
287. Id. at 67.
288. Id. at 66.
289. Id. at 67.
290. MINN. STAT. 572.20(1) (1982). This provision is identical to § 13(a) of the
UAA.
291. Bemidji Clinic, 352 N.W.2d at 67.
292. Id. at 68.
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C. Binding Effect of an Award
As a general rule, an arbitrator's decision is final and binding upon the
parties. This principle was followed in Eisen v. State Department of Public
Welfare, 9' where Eisen, a state employee represented by his union pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement, sued his employer seeking to have an
arbitration award vacated. The court first decided that Eisen had been prop-
erly represented by his union and was without standing to appeal.294 Eisen also
asserted that the arbitrator was guilty of "misconduct" under the Minnesota
statute 95 for erasing the recording of the arbitration proceedings.29 The court
determined that there had been no misconduct since the tape was considered
to be part of the arbitrator's personal notes and not a transcript of the
proceedings.2 97
D. Collateral Proceedings
In Bertling v. Roadway Express,298 the court held that the failure to util-
ize the statutory procedure for attacking the validity of an arbitration award
precludes consideration of an attack on the validity of the award in a collateral
proceeding.29 9 Bertling filed a grievance after being discharged from his job
with Roadway. The arbitration panel found that Bertling's discharge had been
for "just cause." Bertling then filed suit against Roadway for retaliatory dis-
charge."' After determining that the issues in the arbitration proceeding and
in the retaliatory discharge suit were substantially the same, the court found
that Bertling's failure to challenge the arbitration award under the statutory
procedure precluded him from challenging the award by means of the retalia-
tory discharge proceeding.3 '
E. Vacation on Nonstatutory Grounds
In Harris v. Haught,0 2 the court held that an arbitration award can be
vacated only upon the grounds stated in the UAA. The court also decided that
an arbitrator's award cannot be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator
293. 352 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1984).
294. Id. at 736-37.
295. MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (1982). This statute provides in pertinent part: "1.
Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: . . . (2) there was
evident of partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the
arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party."
296. Eisen, 352 N.W.2d at 738.
297. Id.
298. 121 111. App. 3d 60, 459 N.E.2d 265 (1984).
299. Id. at 64, 459 N.E.2d at 267-68.
300. Id. at 61-62, 459 N.E.2d at 265-66.
301. Id. at 64-65, 459 N.E.2d at 267-68.
302. 435 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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lacked jurisdiction over an issue when that issue had been voluntarily submit-
ted to the arbitrator.303 Haught, Harris, and Mumby were partners; Haught
and Harris were also partners in a separate enterprise. Haught and Harris
dissolved their partnership and signed an agreement mutually releasing each
other from further liabilities arising from that partnership. Later, Haught
made a claim against Harris and Mumby for repayment of loans to the
Haught-Harris-Mumby partnership.30'
At arbitration, Harris and Mumby argued that the Harris-Haught release
operated to release them from any further liability to Haught with respect to
the Haught-Harris-Mumby partnership. The arbitrator found against Harris
and Mumby and ordered them to repay the loan to Haught. After Harris and
Mumby refused to comply, Haught filed suit to have the award confirmed.
Harris and Mumby argued that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to construe
the release provision. 3 05 The court decided that since Harris and Mumby vol-
untarily submitted that issue to the arbitrator without objection as to the arbi-
trator's jurisdiction, they could not raise lack of jurisdiction on appeal. The
court further decided that confirmation of the award was proper since an arbi-
tration award can be vacated only upon the grounds stated in the UAA and
Harris and Mumby failed to plead any of these statutory grounds for vacation
of the award.306
VII. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
A. Confirmation
The UAA provides that the court shall confirm an arbitration award upon
application by a party unless a party presents grounds for the modification or
vacation of the award.3 07 Generally, a motion to vacate the award must be
made within ninety days of the applicant's receipt of the award. 0 ' This time
limit is equally applicable if the grounds for vacation are asserted as a defense
to an action to confirm the award3 0 9 or as a "counterclaim" in a confirmation
suit.,',
Courts are reluctant to disturb awards based on issues properly submitted
303. Id. at 928.
304. Id. at 927.
305. Id. at 927-28.
306. Id. at 928.
307. UAA § I I states: "Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an
award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacat-
ing or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as
provided in Sections 12 and 13."
308. UAA § 12(b).
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to arbitration. In considering whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers by
deciding issues not submitted to them, courts will construe the arbitration
agreement and stipulation broadly. 1 Because arbitration laws are enacted to
expedite the settlement of disputes and avoid the delay caused by litigation,
participation in arbitration proceedings without objection results in the waiver
of certain non-statutory defenses to confirmation.3 12 Likewise, courts will not
allow the re-litigation of a factual or legal issue decided by the arbitrator on
proper submission thereof by the parties.3"3 The independent nature of arbitral
and judicial proceedings has led courts to prohibit the assertion of res judicata
as a defense to confirmation where the underlying claim arbitrated was de-
cided differently by a jury. 1 Furthermore, the mootness of the underlying
claim is not a defense to a motion for confirmation because the obligation of
an arbitral award is not necessarily coterminous with the life of the agreement
under which it was rendered.31
In Moseley v. Brewer,3"6 the Arizona Court of Appeals broadly construed
an arbitration agreement to defeat the objecting party's contention that the
arbitrators had exceeded their powers by awarding the other party an amount
different from the two figures submitted by the parties. The parties were attor-
neys who disputed the appropriate division of a contingent fee. Moseley re-
tained Brewer to try a personal injury suit and the two agreed that Brewer
would receive two-thirds of the total one-third contingent fee. During the
course of the litigation, the contingent fee was increased from one-third to
forty-five percent. Moseley claimed that he was entitled to one-third of the
revised fee although Brewer wanted to split that one-third between Moseley
and another attorney. The two submitted their dispute to an arbitration com-
mittee which would determine whether Moseley was entitled to the amount he
sought or the amount Brewer wished him to have. The arbitrators awarded
Moseley a third amount, one-third of the original one-third contingent fee
agreement.3 1 7 At the subsequent confirmation hearing, Brewer argued that be-
cause the parties had not stipulated that the arbitrators could award a third
amount, the arbitrators exceeded their authority under the arbitration agree-
311. See Moseley v. Brewer, 139 Ariz. 540, -, 679 P.2d 563, 565 (Ct. App.
1984); Logan & Clark, Inc. v. Adaptable Dev., Inc., 450 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984).
312. See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983). The defense waived was that the objecting party signed the arbitration agree-
ment in his representative rather than his personal capacity. Id.
313. See Harris v. Haught, 435 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
314. National Indem. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d 748, 751-
52 (Minn. 1984).
315. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 17 Mass. App. Ct. at -, 455
N.E.2d at 1236.
316. 139 Ariz. 540, 679 P.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1984).
317. Id. at __, 679 P.2d at 564.
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ment.318 The trial court agreed and vacated the award.319 The appellate court,
considering the agreement broadly, held that the compromise figure was well
within the issues submitted. Since the agreement did not explicitly limit the
arbitrators to the two figures submitted, the award was proper.3"'
In Koch v. Waller & Co., 32' the Florida District Court of Appeals relied
on one of the fundamental policy bases of arbitration-expeditious resolution
of disputes-in holding that an objection to an award on a non-statutory
ground was waived.3 2 The plaintiff had contracted to do construction work for
the defendant. The plaintiff appended to his signature on the contracts "Pres.
Multiple Images, Inc." A dispute arose between the parties that ended in arbi-
tration. The resulting award was binding both on the plaintiff personally and
on the corporation.3 23 After a petition for confirmation was filed, the plaintiff
raised the issue that the award was not binding on him personally since he had
signed the construction contracts in his representative capacity. The trial court
held that he had waived this objection by participating in the arbitration hear-
ings without raising the issue. The appellate court agreed, noting that arbitra-
tion laws were enacted to avoid the sort of dilatory maneuvering the plaintiff
in this case sought to employ. 2 4
In Harris v. Haught,25 the Florida District Court of Appeals rejected a
party's contention that the arbitrators had misconstrued the contract at issue
because such factual issues are not to be re-litigated after having been resolved
in the arbitral proceeding. Harris and Haught were parties to two separate
partnership agreements. A dispute arose over whether Harris owed Haught for
the repayment of certain loans made between the two partnerships. At the
arbitration hearing, Haught argued that a provision in one of the agreements
released him from the debt at issue. The arbitrators ruled that the release did
not have the effect suggested by Haught and awarded Harris the money he
sought. Harris applied for confirmation of the award and Haught defended on
the basis of the purported release. 2M The trial court rejected this defense and
confirmed the award. The appellate court affirmed, observing that arbitration
awards cannot be vacated simply because a court may disagree with the arbi-
trators' resolution of an issue properly submitted for their consideration."'
The Florida District Court of Appeals in Logan & Clark, Inc. v. Adapta-
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at __ , 679 P.2d at 565.
321. 439 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
322. Id. at 1043-44.
323. Id. at 1042-43.
324. Id. at 1043-44.
325. 435 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
326. Id. at 927.
327. Id. at 927-28.
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ble Development, Inc.,328 held that an arbitration agreement should not be
construed narrowly. 29 The plaintiff, a sub-contractor, submitted to arbitration
a claim against the defendant based on the defendant's breach of contract.
The parties stipulated bifurcation of the arbitration proceedings: the first pro-
ceeding would consider the issue of liability and the second proceeding would
assess damages. During the first proceeding, the arbitrators found that the
defendant had materially breached the contract by failing to post a construc-
tion bond, but that the plaintiff had suffered no damages. Consequently, the
arbitrators dismissed the second proceeding. The defendant filed to have the
proceeding confirmed, but the plaintiff argued that the arbitrators had ex-
ceeded their powers by reaching the issue of quantum meruit in the first pro-
ceeding.330 The trial court confirmed the award, and the appellate court af-
firmed, stating that since the stipulation agreement did not expressly reserve
the issue of quantum meruit for the second proceeding, the arbitrators did not
exceed their authority in considering that issue at the first proceeding. 31
The Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled on two attacks to an arbitration
award in Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Boston Carmen's
Union, Division 589.332 The objecting party contended that the award was be-
yond the scope of the issues submitted for arbitration and that the award had
been rendered moot by the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement
on which the claim had been based. The appellate court dismissed both of
these challenges. The court stated that if in fact the award was beyond the
scope of the issues submitted, the absence of protest by the objecting party at
the hearing created a presumption that the scope of the arbitration was ex-
tended by the parties' consent.3 33 A party will not be heard to object to the
scope of the award after failing to raise the issue at the arbitration proceeding.
Likewise, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the claim had been
rendered moot by the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement upon
which it was based.334 The court first observed that the agreement may not
have expired because of a carry-over provision. Nevertheless, the court stated
that even had the agreement expired, this would not be a defense to confirma-
tion; the obligation of an arbitration award is not necessarily co-terminous
with the life of the agreement upon which it was based.33 5
In Helmerichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co., 36 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that a party is estopped from objecting to an award on
328. 450 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
329. Id. at 1191.
330. Id. at 1190.
331. Id. at 1191.
332. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 455 N.E.2d 1231 (1983), appeal denied, 390 Mass.
1106, 459 N.E.2d 824 (1984).
333. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1235.
334. Id. at , 455 N.E.2d at 1236.
335. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1235-36.
336. 349 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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the grounds that there was no agreement to arbitrate where the issue was not
raised at the arbitration hearing. Helmerichs submitted to arbitration his
claim for wages due under his fixed-term employment contract. At the hear-
ing, the employer argued that the contract was void as against public policy.
In a post-hearing brief, the employer contended for the first time that the
illegality of the contract voided the arbitration clause.831 The employer moved
to have the award vacated on the grounds that there was no agreement to
arbitrate.338 The court of appeals rejected this contention. The court held that
it would be inequitable to allow a party to submit to arbitration and reserve
objections to the agreement to arbitrate until after the hearing; the other party
should have the opportunity to make an informed choice as to whether arbitra-
tion should be continued at the risk of having the agreement ruled invalid or to
pursue an alternative remedy.33 9 Consequently, the bank was estopped from
raising the issue of no agreement to arbitrate after the hearing. 40
In National Indemnity Co. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 4' the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that res judicata principles do not apply to an
arbitration award which is based on a claim previously decided differently by a
jury. The defendant's insured was involved in an automobile accident. Under
Minnesota's No-Fault Act, 42 the insured was paid his claim by Farm Bureau
who then sought indemnity from National, the other driver's insurer, through
arbitration. Prior to the hearing, Farm Bureau's insured secured a jury-verdict
against the other driver for personal injuries purportedly arising from the acci-
dent. The jury found that the other driver was at fault, but that Farm Bu-
reau's insured had suffered no injuries. s~ The arbitrators awarded Farm Bu-
reau the full amount of the benefits paid its insured. The plaintiff sought to
have the award vacated, contending that the jury verdict precluded a finding
that plaintiff was liable for indemnity. The supreme court, relying on its ear-
lier decision in Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co. v. Currier,"" held that res
judicata is not a defense to the confirmation of an arbitration award solely
because the underlying claim would have been barred by res judicata if as-
serted in a court action.3 45 The court noted that there is a strong policy against
judicial interference in the arbitral process. A contrary result would encourage
litigants expecting a favorable jury verdict to "stall out" arbitration.346
337. Id. at 327.
338. Id. at 328. The employer also argued that the issue was non-arbitrable. The
appellate court held that this objection had been waived because of the employer's
failure to raise it at the hearing. Id. at 327.
339. Id. at 328.
340. Id.
341. 348 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1984).
342. MINN. STAT, § 65B.41-.71 (1982).
343. National Indem. Co., 348 N.W.2d at 749.
344. 310 Minn. 81, 245 N.W.2d 248 (1976).
345. National Indem. Co., 378 N.W.2d at 750.
346. Id. at 751.
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In State ex rel. Tri-City Construction Co. v. Marsh,3 4 7 the Missouri
Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award rests
with the state where the award was made. The parties in that case entered
into an arbitration agreement in Kansas which provided that the dispute would
be decided under Kansas' version UAA but did not specify a location for arbi-
tration. Arbitration was held in Jackson County, Missouri, where an award in
favor of Alliett and Williams (Alliett) was entered. Alliett filed the award in
Wyandotte County, Kansas, and then filed a petition to confirm in Jackson
County. Tri-City, against whom the award was made, answered the Jackson
County action and filed a motion to vacate. The Jackson County Circuit Court
dismissed the pleadings on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the arbitration agreement was made in Kansas. 4 8 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that in the absence of Missouri precedents,
and with no "compelling policy to overcome the need for uniformity," Mis-
souri should follow the rule adopted by every other state that had considered
the issue and vest jurisdiction at the place of arbitration.349 The court noted
that if Missouri based jurisdiction on the site of the contract, while other
states based it on the place of arbitration, a Missouri resident who contracted
in another state and arbitrated in Missouri would be without a forum to en-
force its award.3 5 0
In Klimeck v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Agency,35 the
court held in the confirmation hearing that it did not properly have before it
an alleged agreement between the parties which would provide for a different
result from that reached by the arbitrator. The plaintiff received an award in
its favor at arbitration, but asserted that the award was incorrectly figured in
light of an agreement it had with the defendant.352 The court reasoned that
since the plaintiff had settled with defendant's joint tortfeasor and provided
him with a "Pierringer-type" release, thereby protecting the settling tortfeasor
from subrogation claims, the defendant would not be liable for more than its
proportion of the damages as determined by the arbitrators. 53
The reluctance of courts to vacate arbitration awards is illustrated by
their readiness to find that objections and defenses to confirmation have been
waived or have not been raised within the appropriate time limits. This atti-
tude is an appropriate manifestation of the general policy behind the UAA:
that arbitration should be an alternative to litigation rather than merely a
prelude thereto.
347. 668 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
348. Id. at 150.
349. Id. at 151-52.
350. Id. at 152.
351. 348 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
352. Id. at 105.
353. Id. at 105-06.
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A party against whom an arbitration award has been issued may apply to
the court to set aside the award. The court may then vacate the award, but
only if one or more of the five grounds specified in the UAA apply.354 The
aggrieved party must make this application to vacate the award in a timely
fashion or lose the right to have the award vacated. 355 Courts generally hold
that an arbitration award can be vacated only on the grounds specifically set
forth in the UAA.
1. Exceeding the Arbitrator's Authority
Courts in states that have enacted the UAA generally agree that a mis-
take or erroneous interpretation of law by an arbitrator does not constitute an
act in excess of the arbitrator's power. 356 Therefore, the award may be unas-
sailable even if the court believes it may be wrong in fact, or in law, or in
both.3 17 However, some courts hold that an award which is contrary to law is
in excess of the arbitrator's authority and should be modified or corrected.358
An award may not be disturbed unless the arbitrator showed a manifest disre-
354. UAA § 12(a) provides:
Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1)
The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2)
There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or cor-
ruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue
was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party
did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection;
but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm
the award.
355. UAA § 12(b) states:
An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated
upon corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety
days after such grounds are known or should have been known.
356. Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges, 662 S.W.2d 288, 291
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See supra notes 262-283 and accompanying text concerning er-
rors of fact or law.
357. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Carmen's Union, Div. 589, 17
Mass. App. Ct. 104, -, 455 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (1983), appeal denied, 390 Mass.
1106, 459 N.E.2d 824 (1984).
358. E.g., Plymouth-Carver Regional School Dist. v. David M. Crawley Assocs.,
17 Mass. App. Ct. 901, -, 455 N.E.2d 990, 991 (1983).
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gard of the arbitration agreement, 35 9 and a court must vacate an award only
where the arbitrators clearly exceeded their powers.3 60 When determining
whether to vacate an award, the opinions of courts of other jurisdictions which
have enacted the UAA are shown greater than usual deference. 6
In Rural Water District No. 6 Butler County v. Ziegler Corp.,362 the
court held that arbitrators do not exceed their authority by issuing an award
which requires a mathematical calculation for its implementation.36 3 Ziegler
and the water district entered into a contract which contained a liquidated
damages clause. A dispute arose that was taken to arbitration. The arbitrators
terminated Ziegler's services on the project and awarded the water district
liquidated damages of $250 per day as provided in the contract. A portion of
the liquidated damages was to be determined by multiplying the number of
days remaining until completion by $250. 3" Ziegler sought to vacate the
award on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by failing to
render a final award on the water district's claim for liquidated damages .3
5
The court held that the award for future liquidated damages, being ascertain-
able by a simple mathematical calculation, was a final award.3 66
McDonald v. Hardee County School Board367 similarly held that an arbi-
trator does not exceed his authority by reaching a decision on an issue volunta-
rily submitted to arbitration.3 68 McDonald was dismissed from his job as a
teacher. He filed a grievance seeking reinstatement and back pay. The parties
stipulated that the arbitrator could decide the appropriate remedy. The arbi-
trator sustained the grievance and reduced the discipline from discharge to
suspension without pay. McDonald filed suit to vacate the award and con-
tended that in sustaining the grievance the arbitrator had no authority to do
other than order reinstatement with back pay. The court stated that since Mc-
Donald initially stipulated that the arbitrator had authority to modify the dis-
cipline, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in doing So.369
In Moseley v. Brewer, °70 the court held that arbitrators do not necessarily
359. See In re Arbitration between AFSCME Dist. Council 96 and Independent
School Dist. No. 381, Two Harbors, 351 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
360. National Indem. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d 748, 750
(Minn. 1984).
361. Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges, 662 S.W.2d 288, 290-
91 (Mo Ct. App. 1983).
362. 9 Kan. App. 2d 305, 677 P.2d 573 (1984).
363. Id. at , 677 P.2d at 581.
364. Id. at , 677 P.2d at 577.
365. Id. at , 677 P.2d at 580.
366. Id. at , 677 P.2d at 581.
367. 448 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.
1984).
368. Id. at 595.
369. Id. at 594-95.
370. - Ariz. ., 679 P.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1984).
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exceed their authority by awarding an amount that is not the exact dollar sum
claimed by either party. Moseley and Brewer were attorneys who disagreed on
the appropriate division of the fee in a case in which they were joint counsel.
The parties submitted their dispute, along with their fee agreement, to arbitra-
tion. The arbitrators awarded to Moseley an amount based on the fee agree-
ment but different from that which each party claimed was due to him.
Brewer challenged the award on the basis that the arbitrators had no authority
to award an unsubmitted compromise figure. The court found that even
though the award varied from the amount claimed by the parties, the award
was valid.37 1 Arbitrators do not exceed their authority by awarding an amount
that differs from the amounts claimed by the parties where the arbitrators
arrive at their figure on the basis of the agreement between the parties.3 2
In Plymouth-Carver Regional School District v. David M. Crawley Asso-
ciates,373 the court held that arbitrators do exceed their authority where the
award effectively circumvents the provisions of a statute. Pursuant to a statute,
two towns voted substantial sums for expenses to build a regional high school.
When the amount authorized was exhausted, the architectural firm indicated
it would not continue work without assurances that sufficient funds would be
available to pay for its services. The two towns disapproved a supplemental
appropriation, but the school committee voted to use its "surplus revenue" ac-
count. The committee made payments from this fund until it abandoned the
project. Consequently, the school district challenged an arbitration award
made to the architectural firm.3 74 The court held that the arbitrators exceeded
their authority by ordering the use of the "surplus revenue" to pay the archi-
tectural firm because the use of such funds would, in these circumstances,
effectively circumvent the veto powers provided to the towns by the statute.17 5
In re Arbitration between AFSCME District Council 96 & Independent
School District No. 381, Two Harbors,3 76 dealt with whether seniority would
accrue from the date of joining a union or from the date of employment. The
court ruled that as long as the award derived its "essence" from the collective
bargaining agreement the arbitrator had not exceeded his or her power.3 77 Ac-
cording to the court, "essence" is determined from the language and context
which indicate the party's intent. It is only where there is a total disregard of
the agreement and of principles of contract construction that the court may
find that the arbitrator exceeded his or her permissible scope.1 8
In Iowa City Community School District v. Iowa City Education Associ-
371. Id. at __, 679 P.2d at 564.
372. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 565.
373. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 455 N.E.2d 990 (1983).
374. Id. at -, 455 N.E.2d at 990-91.
375. Id. at , 455 N.E.2d at 991.
376. 351 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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ation,78 the school district appealed from an arbitrator's decision that the dis-
trict had wrongfully denied a teacher a scheduled salary increase when the
district found the teacher's performance unsatisfactory. 38 0 The district argued
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in deciding what constituted unsatis-
factory teacher performance. 8 ' The Supreme Court of Iowa said the standard
for deciding if an arbitrator had exceeded his authority was whether the
award "drew its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement.3 82 The
court stated that this was an extremely broad concept which included written
and unwritten agreements, and concepts of fairness, reasonableness, and prac-
ticality in the industry in question. 383 Because the agreement to arbitrate did
not limit the issues that the arbitrator could decide, it was left up to the arbi-
trator to decide what constituted satisfactory performance. 384 The court stated
that the arbitrator did not ignore his duty to the agreement and that this deci-
sion was within the principles of similar cases. 385
In Aamot v. Eneboe,3886 the South Dakota Supreme Court held that when
an arbitration award does not conform to the subject matter of the agreement,
the arbitrators have exceeded their powers and the award may be set aside by
the courts. Aamot bought some land from Eneboe and made payments for
four years.3 87 Aamot tried to pay the balance of the contract price, but Eneboe
refused payment. When the disagreement was submitted to arbitration, the
arbitrators divided the land between Aamot and Eneboe. 8 This solution was
not one of the possibilities specified in the arbitration agreement. Therefore,
the court ruled that since arbitrators derive their power from the arbitration
agreement, the arbitrators exceeded their power and the trial court acted prop-
erly in vacating the award. 8 8
In National Indemnity Co. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,3"' the
court held that fact-findings in judicial proceedings and in arbitration actions
are independent and therefore, arbitrators are not bound by fact-findings of a
jury in a prior action involving the same dispute. The court affirmed the prin-
ciple that only where the arbitrators have clearly exceeded their powers must a
court vacate an award. 39 Farm Bureau had recovered sums it had paid its no-
fault insured from National, the insurer of the defendant in an action brought
379. 343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1984).
380. Id. at 140-41.
381. Id. at 141.
382. Id. at 142.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 143.
385. Id. at 144.
386. 352 N.W.2d 647 (S.D. 1984).
387. Id. at 648.
388. Id. at 648-49.
389. Id. at 649-50.
390. 348 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1984).
391. Id. at 750.
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by Farm Bureau's insured. The recovery had been in an arbitration proceeding
under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act.3 92 The decision of
the arbitrators was rendered after a jury verdict, in a case between the in-
sureds, which found that Farm Bureau's insured had sustained no damage
from the automobile accident with National's insured. The court concluded
that even though the jury found that the insured had suffered no loss, the
award should not be vacated because the arbitrators found that Farm Bureau
had suffered loss and was entitled to reimbursement.3 93
2. Bias or Partiality
An award may be vacated where there is evidence of bias or arbitrator
partiality which prejudiced the rights of any party. 94 Arbitration awards have
been vacated when there was an appearance of possible bias,315 or when rela-
tionships were long-standing and repeated.3 96
In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Stariha 397 the appellant, an insurance com-
pany, moved to vacate the arbitration award claiming that the arbitrator's
failure to disclose an attorney-client relationship constituted "fraud or other
undue means" or "evident partiality. 3 98 During the arbitration proceedings,
the neutral arbitrator did not disclose that he represented the law firm of the
attorney for one of the parties who sought arbitration.3 99 The United States
Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have reversed arbitration
awards where relationships were long-standing and repeated;4 0 however, in
this case, the court found neither condition existed. 01 The court did recognize
the need for arbitrators to disclose any relationship which could affect their
impartiality and outlined disclosure standards. 0 '
392. MINN. STAT. ANN. 65B.41-71 (West Supp. 1995).
393. Id. at 752.
394. UAA § 12(a)(2).
395. 59 Md. App. 154, 474 A.2d 959, cert. denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801
(1984)
396. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968); see also Northwest Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 283
N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1979).
397. 346 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
398. Id. at 666, citing MINN. STAT. § 572.19.1 (1982).
399. Stariha, 346 N.W.2d at 665.
400. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968); see also Northwest Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 283
N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1979).
401. Stariha, 346 N.W.2d at 666.
402. Id. at 666-67 (arbitrators should, before accepting an appointment, disclose
any financial interests in the dispute and any relationships which are likely to affect
impartiality or give the appearance of partiality or bias, and should make a reasonable
effort to inform themselves of any such interests or relationships).
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In Hartman v. Cooper,""3 the court ruled that vacation of an award on
the ground of evident partiality required only an appearance of possible
bias.4"4 An arbitration panel denied recovery on a medical malpractice claim.
In answering questions on a data sheet, a doctor, who was a member of the
arbitration panel, failed to disclose that he was being sued for malpractice and
that he had been deposed as a witness in other malpractice suits."0 5 The court
stated that the failure of the doctor to disclose relevant information supported
the inference of the existence of bias, prejudice, or partiality. The court over-
turned the award and held that the appearance of possible bias was sufficient
to require the vacation of the award.
40 6
In Bernstein v. Grammercy Mills, Inc.,407 the court held that minor un-
disclosed connections between an arbitrator and the attorneys for one of the
parties to the proceeding are not sufficient to compel vacation of an award on
the ground of evident partiality of an arbitrator.40 8 Grammercy sought vaca-
tion of the award on the ground that it had discovered connections between
the arbitrator and Bernstein's attorneys. The arbitrator was associated with a
law firm, and Bernstein's attorneys were associated with another law firm. The
arbitrator and one of Bernstein's attorneys had represented clients with diver-
gent interests in a legal controversy three years previously. Moreover, attor-
neys from the two firms had been mutually involved in legal matters on nine
occasions and had met socially on six occasions over a five year period. How-
ever, in none of these instances was the arbitrator a participant."0 9 The court
held that these undisclosed relationships were so minor that any challenge to
the award on the basis of evident partiality would fail."0O
3. Refusal to Postpone Hearing
In L.R. Foy Construction Co. v. Spearfish School District,"' the court
held that refusal to postpone a hearing was not sufficiently prejudicial to the
complaining party to justify vacation of the arbitrator's award. Foy claimed
that the arbitrator should have postponed the hearing until it could produce a
witness to testify to issues for which it claimed surprise. The court rejected
these arguments because the facts showed that the proposed testimony went to
issues on which Foy had notice, and the substance of the proposed testimony
403. 59 Md. App. 154, 474 A.2d 959, cert denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801
(1984).
404. Id. at 168, 474 A.2d at 967.
405. Id. at 158-59, 474 A.2d at 962.
406. Id. at 167-68, 474 A.2d at 966-67.
407. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 452 N.E.2d 231 (1983).
408. Id. at __, 452 N.E.2d at 237.
409. Id. at , 452 N.E.2d at 232-34.
410. Id. at__, 452 N.E.2d at 237.
411. 341 N.W.2d 383 (S.D. 1983).
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had already been heard in other forms."12
4. Different Parties
In State v. Martin,413 the court found that the state could not challenge
an award under the UAA through a case with similar facts but different par-
ties. 414 A group of state prison system teachers filed a complaint charging un-
satisfactory working conditions based on disparity of wages and hours among
professionals of the same level. The disparity resulted from an arbitration
award in a prior claim by other teachers.415 The court refused to hear an argu-
ment that the prior award was inconsistent with legislative intent, holding that
the state was attempting to vacate an award outside the statutory
provisions.41 6
5. Failure to Provide Transcript
In Wicomico County Education Association v. Board of Education,417
the court ruled that the plaintiff's failure to provide the court with a transcript
of the arbitration proceeding rendered the court powerless to vacate an
award.4"' A transcript was never made of the proceeding in which the plaintiff
sought appointment as the Wicomico High School baseball coach.4 9 The
plaintiff sought a trial de novo on part of the factual evidence heard by the
arbitrator. The court held that the arbitration statute420 did not authorize the
court to conduct a partial or complete hearing de novo on a factual issue.
Furthermore, where there is a factual dispute, a transcript may be
necessary.42'
Similarly, in Rural Water District No. 6 Butler County v. Ziegler
Corp.,4 22 the failure to provide a transcript of the arbitration proceedings ren-
dered an arbitrator's order unappealable. The court held that it could not rule
on the question of whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority by refusing to
grant a request for postponement,423 since Ziegler failed to present a document
or transcript to the court reflecting the request. Although Ziegler alleged that
412. Id. at 385-86.
413. - Ind. App. -, 460 N.E.2d 986 (1984).
414. Id. at __ , 460 N.E.2d at 991.
415. See State Dep't of Admin., Personnel Div. v. Sightes, - Ind. App.
416 N.E.2d 445 (1981).
416. Martin, __ Ind. App. at _ , 460 N.E.2d at 991.
417. 59 Md. App. 564, 477 A.2d 279 (1984).
418. Id. at 570, 477 A.2d at 282.
419. Id. at 565-67, 477 A.2d at 280.
420. MD. CTS. AND JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b) (1973).
421. Wicomico, 59 Md. App. at 567-70, 477 A.2d at 280-82.
422. 9 Kan. App. 2d 305, 677 P.2d 573 (1984).
423. Id. at - , 677 P.2d at 579.
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it asked for a postponement, it made no record of its request.42
6. Standing to Apply for Vacation of an Award
In Eisen v. State Department of Public Welfare,425 the court concluded
that to determine who is a "party" for purposes of applying for vacation of an
arbitration award, the collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitra-
tion must be consulted since the UAA does not define "party" for such pur-
poses.4 " The court also concluded that the arbitrator was justified in denying
a request for the transcript of the arbitration hearing and in subsequently de-
stroying the transcript in the normal course of business.42 7 Eisen was fired
from his job at Faribault State Hospital. The propriety of the discharge was
submitted to arbitration by the union under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The arbitrator's award sustained the discharge and the union decided
not to appeal. Eisen retained an attorney to seek vacation of the award. The
attorney requested a copy of the taped recording of the hearing from the arbi-
trator, but did not state that she represented Eisen or her reasons for wanting
the recording. The arbitrator refused the request, claiming the recording was
part of his personal notes because neither party to the arbitration had re-
quested a recording be made of the hearing, and later erased the recording.
The lower court vacated the award, but the Supreme Court of Minnesota re-
versed because Eisen was not a "party" for purposes of appealing the award
under the collective bargaining agreement 428 and because, under the circum-
stances of this case, the arbitrator was justified in denying Eisen's attorney's
request. Also, erasing the recording in the normal course of business was not
misconduct by the arbitrator.4 29
7. Waiver of Right to Vacate
In Helmerichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co.,430 the court stated
the principle that by participating in arbitration without raising an objection
to the arbitration, a party may lose the right to object to arbitration and
thereby the right to have an award vacated under UAA section 12(a)(5),"81
and under UAA sectionl2(a)(3) 432 when the claim that the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers is based on the issue of arbitrability."3 In a post-arbitra-
424. Id. at -, 677 P.2d at 579-80.
425. 352 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1984).
426. Id. at 734.
427. Id. at 738.
428. Id. at 736.
429. Id. at 738.
430. 349 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
431. UAA § 12 (a)(5), supra note 354.
432. UAA § 12 (a)(3), supra note 354.
433. Helmerichs, 349 N.W.2d at 327.
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tion brief, the bank argued that the employment contract which was the sub-
ject of the arbitration was illegal, and that this illegality voided the arbitration
clause of the contract. Because of this, the bank moved to vacate the award
under Minnesota Statutes section 572.19, which contains provisions identical
to UAA section 12(a)(3) and (5). The trial court confirmed the award in favor
of Helmerichs, finding the bank's objection to arbitrability untimely since the
illegality argument was not raised until a post-hearing brief was submitted to
the arbitrators. 434 Because this finding was not clearly erroneous, the court of
appeals dismissed the bank's appeal.4"5
8. Notice of Arbitration Proceedings
Basic due process notions apply to hearings connected with arbitration. In
Cassidy v. Keystone Insurance Co.,43 6 the court vacated the arbitrators' award
due to the insufficient service of a petition to appoint an arbitrator. Although
this is not an express ground for vacation of an award, the UAA does provide
for service of a writ of summons as prescribed by law in a civil action.
43 7
Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, service under the circum-
stances of this case had to be made by a sheriff.43 8 The original petitioner,
appellee here, mailed the petition after the court held a hearing and appointed
an arbitrator. The petition to compel arbitration was viewed by the court as a
bill to compel specific performance of an arbitration agreement, and as such, it
required that the petition be served by a sheriff prior to the hearing.439
VIII. APPEALS
Section 19 of the UAA specifies those orders, judgments or decrees from
which an appeal may be taken. 440 While most enacted versions of the UAA
434. Id.
435. Id. at 328.
436. 322 Pa. Super. 168, 469 A.2d 236 (1983).
437. UAA § 16 provides:
Except as otherwise provided, an application to the court under this act
shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice
provided by law or rule of court for the making and hearing of motions. Un-
less the parties have agreed otherwise, notice of an initial application for an
order shall be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a sum-
mons in an action.
The Pennsylvania Arbitration Act contains language substantially similar to that of
UAA § 16.
438. PA. R. Civ. P. 233.
439. 322 Pa. Super. at -, 469 A.2d at 239.
440. UAA § 19(a) provides that an appeal may be taken from:
(I) An order denying an application to compel arbitration under section
2; (2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under section
2(b); (3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (4) An
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contain appeal provisions, the content of those provisions vary. 4 ' Additionally,
even where the appeal provisions are identical, judicial interpretations of those
provisions vary. Courts consistently agree, however, on the importance of al-
lowing an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. 4 2 On the
other hand, section 19 does not permit an interlocutory appeal from an order
compelling arbitration." 3 Section 19 does permit appeals from orders which
modify, correct, confirm, or deny confirmation of an arbitrator's award,"' and
allows review of any judgments or decrees which result from arbitration."45
Appeals taken under the UAA are to follow the same procedure and are per-
mitted to the same extent as appeals from orders of judgments in civil
actions.4'"
A. Orders Compelling Arbitration
Although the UAA allows interlocutory appeals from orders which deny
parties an opportunity to arbitrate, 4 7 there is no similar provision for appeals
from orders compelling arbitration. Thus, a party who has been ordered to
submit to arbitration following his refusal to do so voluntarily, ordinarily may
not appeal the order until after the conclusion of arbitration. This is consistent
with the policy of encouraging arbitration.
In Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki," 8 the North Carolina Court of Appeals dis-
missed an appeal from an order compelling arbitration. The court did not be-
lieve that the order compelling arbitration affected a substantial right or that
the appellant would be harmed by delaying review of the issues.4 9 On the
basis of these conclusions, the court could find no justification outside the
UAA for allowing an appeal. 450 The court also noted the UAA's objective of
promoting uniformity in the laws of states which adopt the act. In light of that
order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating an award
without directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant
to the provisions of this Act.
Section 19(b) provides that appeals are to be taken in the same manner and to the
same extent as from orders or judgments in civil actions.
441. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10 § 118 (Smith-Hurd 1975) with KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 5-418 (1982).
442. See Manalili v. Commercial Mowing & Grading, 442 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); J & K Cement Constr. v. Montalbano Builders, 119 Ill. App. 3d
663, 675, 456 N.E.2d 889, 902 (1983) (denying motion to compel arbitration would
deprive parties of contractual right to arbitrate disputes).
443. Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki, 68 N.C. App 284, 314 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
444. UAA § 19(a)(3)-(5).
445. UAA § 19(a)(6).
446. UAA § 19(b).
447. UAA § 19(a)(I),(2).
448. 68 N.C. App. 284, 314 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
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objective, it followed the lead of cases from other jurisdictions' 5' in holding
that there is no right of appeal from an order compelling arbitration.4
52
In Old Rochester Regional Teacher's Club v. Old Rochester Regional
School District,'453 the defendant school district appealed from an order com-
pelling arbitration and the denial of its motion to enjoin the plaintiffs pursuit
of arbitration. The court dismissed the appeal from the order compelling arbi-
tration since an order compelling arbitration was not listed as an appealable
order in Massachusetts' arbitration statute. 54 The appeal from the denial of
the injunction against plaintiffs pursuit of arbitration was also dismissed,
since an injunction in this case would be the equivalent of a motion to stay
arbitration, the denial of which would not be appealable under Massachusetts'
arbitration statute. The appellate court stated that since Massachusetts views
the list of appealable orders as comprehensive, an appeal (at least as of right)
from any type of order not listed is precluded.455
In Hodes v. Comprehensive Health Associates,'4 56 the plaintiff physician
filed a petition for breach of contract in response to the defendant's demand
for determination of the controversy by arbitration. The plaintiff then filed for
a stay of arbitration and a temporary restraining order (TRO). The TRO was
granted by the trial court to restrain the defendant from prosecuting the de-
mand for arbitration pending the outcome of the plaintiff's application for a
stay of the arbitration proceedings. Following judicial review of the contract's
arbitration provision, the court dissolved the TRO, denied the motion to stay
arbitration, and directed the parties to proceed with arbitration. The plaintiff
appealed from the court's order denying the motion to stay arbitration.
57
Under the UAA, however, an order denying a motion to stay arbitration is not
listed as an appealable order. 58 Therefore, according to the Hodes court, "the
fact the legislature saw fit to specify in one code section the different orders
and judgments from which appeals may be taken clearly indicates . .. an
intention to restrict the appeals in such proceedings to the orders and judg-
ments therein specified."' 59 Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
60
451. In support of its holding the court cited the following cases: Hodes v. Com-
prehensive Health Assocs., 9 Kan. App. 2d 36, 670 P.2d 76 (1983); Roeder V. Huish,
195 Ariz. 508, 467 P.2d 902 (1970); Maietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 297 A.2d
244 (1972): Harris v. Insurance Co., 283 So. 2d 147 (Fla. App. 1973); Clark County v.
Empire Elec., Inc., 96 Nev. 18, 604 P.2d 352 (1980).
452. Wysocki, Id. at - , 314 S.E.2d at 293.
453. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 463 N.E.2d 581 (1984).
454. Id. at -, 463 N.E.2d at 581-82 (construing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
251, § 118 (West Supp. 1980) (identical to UAA § 19)).
455. Id. at - , 463 N.E.2d at 582.
456. 9 Kan. App. 2d 36, 670 P.2d 76 (1983).
457. Id. at 36, 670 P.2d at 76.
458. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-418 (1982) (identical to UAA § 19).
459. Hodes, 9 Kan. App. 2d at __ , 670 P.2d at 78.
460. Id. The plaintiff also urged that the trial court's order should be construed
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In Rural Water District No. 6 Butler County v. Ziegler Corp.,"' the
Water District and Ziegler Corporation were parties to a construction contract
which contained an arbitration clause. 62 Upon receiving written demand to
terminate work on the District's water supply system, Ziegler filed a motion to
compel arbitration, which the trial court granted. At arbitration, the arbitra-
tors denied Ziegler's claim, terminated Ziegler's work on the project, and
awarded damages to the District. The District then filed a motion to confirm
the award which was granted. Ziegler appealed from this order.6 3 On appeal,
the court stated that while the right to appeal is statutorily mandated, the
scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is severely limited. 44 The trial
court's confirmation of the award was affirmed.
4 65
In Anthony Plumbing v. Attorney General,466 Anthony Plumbing was
found to have violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act4 67 by engaging
in unfair and deceptive trade practices. The defendant appealed to the court of
special appeals. Before any proceeding in that court, the Maryland Court of
Appeals granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.46 8 Although the
case did not involve an arbitration agreement, appeals from arbitration orders
were mentioned by the court. In specifying those interlocutory orders entered
by a circuit court in a civil case from which an appeal may be taken, the court
stated that an appeal is allowable from an order granting a petition to stay
arbitration. 6 9 No other arbitration order or judgments are specifically listed as
appealable by Maryland's arbitration statute.470
as an order denying or dissolving an injunction. Id. at -, 670 P.2d at 77 (such an
order would be appealable under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2102(a)(2)(1982)). The appel-
late court held that the order could not be so construed as the plaintiff had realized the
relief sought in his TRO; the defendant was restrained from prosecuting on the arbitra-
tion issue until the decision was made concerning the plaintiff's application to stay
arbitration. Id.
461. 9 Kan. App. 2d 305, 677 P.2d 573 (1984).
462. Id. at __ , 677 P.2d at 577.
463. Id. Although the appellate court did not specify its jurisdictional basis for
hearing the appeal, the right to appeal from an order confirming an arbitration award
exists under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-418(a)(3)(1982), which provides that an appeal may
be taken from an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award.
464. Rural Water District, 9 Kan. App. 2d at __, 677 P.2d at 579 (quoting
Coleman v. Local No. 570, 181 Kan. 969, 980, 317 P.2d 831, 841 (1957) ("[n]othing
in the award relative to the merits of the controversy as submitted, even though incor-
rectly decided, is grounds for setting aside an award in the absence of fraud, miscon-
duct, or other valid objections.").
465. Id. at -, 677 P.2d at 579.
466. 298 Md. 11, 467 A.2d 504 (1983).
467. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -501 (1975).
468. Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 11, 467 A.2d at 504.
469. Id. at 15, 467 A.2d at 507 (quoting MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
12-303 (1980)).
470. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1980).
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Schmidt v. Clothier47 1 was a consolidation of cases which involved various
aspects of underinsurance coverage and subrogation rights. In the first case
discussed, plaintiff Schmidt and defendant Safeco were unable to agree on
their rights and obligations under an underinsurance policy. Upon motion by
the defendant, the district court ordered Safeco to pay underinsured benefits
of $100,000 to the plaintiff or submit the matter to arbitration. Safeco failed
to comply with either order."7 2 The appellate court granted discretionary re-
view even though no right to appeal an order compelling arbitration exists
under Minnesota's arbitration statute.
47 3
B. Orders Denying the Compulsion of Arbitration
Interlocutory orders denying the compulsion of arbitration are appealable
under the UAA. 4 74 In Blow v. Shaughnessy,47 5 the defendants were permitted
to appeal an order by the trial court denying their application to compel arbi-
tration.470 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, relying on the UAA, 477 sum-
marily concluded that the defendants' appeal was not premature since the
statute specifically provided for appeals in these circumstances. 4 "7 The court
then affirmed the trial court's holding that the controversy was not subject to a
valid arbitration agreement. 47
9
As in Blow, the Texas Court of Appeals in NCR Corp. v. Mr. Penguin
Tuxedo Rental and Sales,48 also addressed whether a valid arbitration agree-
ment existed between the parties and whether an interlocutory appeal was ap-
propriate from an order denying compulsion of arbitration. The court first de-
termined that the agreements to arbitrate did not bind the parties. 8" Unlike
the court in Blow, however, the court concluded that because the arbitration
agreements were unenforceable, the UAA and its provisions for interlocutory
471. 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
472. Id.
473. Id. at 263 (construing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.26 (West Supp. 1983)).
The court stated that several important questions of insurance law have arisen in the
area of underinsurance coverage. Id. at 259. Apparently, the court believed that an-
swering these questions was more important than strict statutory construction.
474. UAA § 19(a)(l).
475. 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868, review denied, 311 N.C. 751, 321 S.E.2d
127 (1984).
476. Id. at -, 313 S.E.2d at 874.
477. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.3 (1983) (similar to UAA § 19)
478. Blow, 68 N.C. App. at __ , 313 S.E.2d at 874.
479. Id. at -, 313 S.E.2d at 880.
480. 663 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
481. The arbitration agreements in this case were invalid on their face, and the
appellant apparently did not contend otherwise. TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (1973)
applied to the agreements in question. This statute requires that an agreement to arbi-
trate show that it was concluded with the aid of counsel. The agreements in this case
did not comply with this requirement. 663 S.W.2d at 108.
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appeals did not apply.482 Because it could find no basis outside the UAA for
allowing an interlocutory appeal on the trial court's order, the appellate court
dismissed the appeal. 483
In J & K Cement Construction v. Montalbano Builders,4 84 defendant-
appellee Falbo entered into a construction contract with defendant-appellant
Montalbano. The contract included an arbitration agreement. Montalbano
subsequently entered into contractual agreements with several subcontractors.
During the course of construction a dispute arose and Falbo refused to make
further payments until certain corrections were made. Several subcontractors
filed suit to foreclose mechanics' liens. Falbo filed an answer and counter-
claimed against Montalbano. In response to the complaints, Montalbano filed
a motion to stay all proceedings and compel arbitration between Montalbano
and Falbo. The trial court denied the motion and Montalbano appealed. "85 On
appeal, the appellate court stated that "although the order appealed from in
the instant case is interlocutory, we nonetheless have jurisdiction, for the trial
court's denial of the requested relief is analogous to the denial of an injunc-
tion."4 6 After finding that the contract contained a valid arbitration agree-
ment, the court stated that "the policy of the Uniform Arbitration Act
adopted by Illinois and other States which favors arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution would be frustrated if the courts could not enforce arbitra-
tion agreements. '48 7 The court added that the denial of Montalbano's motion
to compel arbitration would effectively deny the parties their contractual right
to arbitrate their disputes.4 88
Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp.489 is another Illinois case involving the denial
of a motion to compel arbitration. In a dispute over obligations under a
purchase agreement, seller Notaro filed a complaint seeking declaratory judg-
ment. Buyer Nor-Evan moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitra-
tion. Upon denial of its motion, Nor-Evan appealed. The appellate court
granted the appeal, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision.490 In
granting the appeal, no reference was made to Illinois' arbitration act. Instead,
both courts analogized the denial of the defendant's motion to compel arbitra-
482. 663 S.W.2d at 108.
483. Id.
484. 119 III. App. 3d 663, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983).
485. Id. at 663, 456 N.E.2d at 889. The appeal sections of Illinois' arbitration
statute contain only a portion of § 19 of the UAA. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10 § 118
(Smith-Hurd 1975) (identical to UAA § 19(b)) provides that "appeals are to be taken
in the same manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in civil
actions."
486. J & K Cement, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 667, 456 N.E.2d at 892.
487. Id. at 681, 456 N.E.2d at 902.
488. Id.
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tion to an order granting or denying a temporary injunction. 91 Viewing it as
such, the court held that an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory court
order granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve an
injunction.492
In Manalili v. Commercial Mowing and Grading,491 a dispute arose re-
garding payment under a contract which contained an arbitration provision.
Following Commercial Mowing's filing of a complaint for breach of contract,
Manalili filed a motion to stay the proceedings and a demand for arbitration.
The motion was denied and Manalili appealed."94 The right to appeal from
this order apparently existed as a matter of law.495 However, appellants sought
discretionary review through a writ of certiorari. 96 The court allowed the ap-
peal, stating its jurisdiction was "invoked pursuant to Florida Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 9.100. '' 19 7 As authority for granting the appeal, the Manalili
court relied on Vic Potamkin Chevrolet v. Bloom.491 In Vic Potamkin Chevro-
let, an appeal was taken from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration.
The appellants claimed that the "right to an interlocutory appeal was con-
ferred by Florida Arbitration Code section 682.20(1)(a)."4 99 The court of ap-
peals stated that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.010 provides in part:
"[tihese rules shall supersede all conflicting rules and statutes." 500 The court
interpreted this procedural rule to mean that all other statutes purporting to
govern the right to appeal are inoperative. 50 1
In both Vic Potamkin Chevrolet and Manalili, the order denying the mo-
tion to compel arbitration was interlocutory in nature. As a general rule, non-
final orders are not immediately appealable.50 2 In Manalili, however, the Flor-
ida District Court of Appeals granted the appeal stating that where a "right to
compel arbitration exists, such a denial departs from the essential require-
ments of law." 50 3
Sabates v. International Medical Centers5 0 4 is a Florida case in which the
plaintiff petitioned for a writ of certiorari following a court order compelling
491. Id. at 270, 456 N.E.2d at 94 (construing Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp., 197
Ill. App. 3d 1168, 441 N.E.2d 186 (1982)).
492. Id. (quoting Ill. R. Civ. P. 307(a)(1)).
493. 442 So. 2d 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
494. Id.
495. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.20 (West Supp. 1984).
496. Manalili, 442 So. 2d at 411.
497. Id. at 412.
498. 386 So. 2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
499. Id. at 287.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 101, at 697 (4th ed. 1983).
503. Manalili, 442 So. 2d at 412 (quoting Vic Potamkin Chevrolet v. Bloom, 386
So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
504. 450 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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arbitration. Respondent Medical Center contended that, unlike an order deny-
ing a motion to compel arbitration, an order granting a motion to compel arbi-
tration was not immediately appealable.5 5 The Florida District Court of Ap-
peals held that "orders compelling arbitration and staying court proceedings
pending the outcome of arbitration were reviewable by certiorari."506
As in Manalili, it is difficult to ascertain the grounds upon which the
Florida District Court of Appeals based its jurisdiction. Florida Appellate
Court jurisdiction to hear appeals is quite broad. While Rule 9.130507 appears
to limit the court's jurisdiction in this area, Rule 9.030 grants certiorari juris-
diction to the district courts of appeal to review "non-final orders of the lower
tribunals other than those described by Rule 9.130."508 Without further guid-
ance from the court it is difficult to ascertain the category of non-final trial
court orders to which this order belongs.
Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges50 9 involved a contrac-
tual dispute. After filing complaints and counterclaims, the parties filed a joint
stipulation in court to have their claims resolved in accordance with the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act,510 and Missouri's arbitration act.511 Following a hearing,
the arbitrators rendered a decision for Lindenwood in the amount of $92,000.
Western's motion to vacate the award was denied, while Lindenwood's motion
to confirm the award was granted. Western appealed from the denial of its
motion to vatate the award. 51 '2 The appellate court stated that no right to ap-
peal from the denial of a motion to vacate an award exists under Missouri's
arbitration act. 1 3 The court construed the appeal from the denial of a motion
to vacate the award as a premature appeal from the trial court's order con-
firming the award.514 The latter is appealable under Missouri's arbitration
statute while the former is not. 51 5
The Lindenwood court set forth several reasons for allowing the appeal.
Citing Rule g1.05(b) of Missouri Rules of Court, the court stated that "when
'a notice of appeal has been filed prematurely, such notice shall be considered
as filed immediately after the time the judgment becomes final for the purpose
of appeal.' "516 The court also noted that it is often difficult, especially in the
area of arbitration, to tell when a judgment is final. 51 7 According to the court,
505. Id.
506. Id. at 516.
507. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130.
508. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(A).
509. 662 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
510. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
511. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (Supp. 1982).
512. Western Waterproofing, 662 S.W.2d at 288.
513. Id. at 289 (construing Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.440 (Supp. 1982)).
514. Id.
515. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.440 (Supp. 1982).
516. Western Waterproofing, 662 S.W.2d at 289 (quoting Mo. R. Ct. 81.05(b)).
517. Id. at 289.
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Rule 81.05 seeks to preserve an appeal for litigants whose overly cautious or
mistaken counsel prematurely filed an appeal. For these reasons, the court of
appeals treated the appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate the award
as a good faith effort to appeal from the trial court's confirmation of the
award.5 1 8
C. Orders Confirming an Arbitrator's Award
The UAA also permits appeals from orders confirming an arbitrator's
award. 519 This provision has been used to permit appeals even when other
claims between the parties are pending. By allowing an immediate appeal, a
court may avoid the possibility of inconsistent holdings. This procedure was
followed in Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. Lafave Co.,5 0 where the trial
court affirmed the arbitrator's award. One of the defendants subsequently ap-
pealed, despite the fact that other claims between the defendants remained to
be adjudicated.5 2  The North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed an interlocu-
tory appeal, noting that if the trial court adjudicated the parties' remaining
disputes before the appeal, the holding eventually reached on the appeal could
be inconsistent with the trial court's other rulings.5 22
D. Appellate Procedure
Appeals permitted by section 19 of the UAA are to be taken in the same
manner and to the same extent as appeals from civil actions. 2 3 The implica-
tions of this section were examined in Haegele v. Pennsylvania General Insur-
ance Co.,524 where the trial court denied the defendant's motion to vacate or
modify the arbitrator's award. The defendant entered no objections to the trial
judge's order, and the plaintiff contended that, as a consequence, no issues
were preserved for appeal. The defendant, however, argued that the proceed-
ing before the trial judge had been a hearing on a petition and not a bench
trial, thus making it exempt from the rule5 25 which requires exceptions to the
518. Id.
519. UAA § 19(a)(3).
520. 67 N.C.App. 278, 312 S.E.2d 709 (1984).
521. Id. at - , 312 S.E.2d at 710. The other claims were not subject to
arbitration.
522. Id.
523. UAA § 19(b).
524. 300 Pa. Super. 481, 479 A.2d 1005 (1984).
525. Pa. R.C.P. 1038(d) provides:
Within ten (10) days after notice of the filing of the decision, exceptions may
be filed by any party to the decision or any part thereof, to rulings on objec-
tions to evidence or to any other matters occurring during the trial. Each
exception shall set forth a separate objection precisely and without discussion.
Matters not covered by exceptions are deemed waived unless, prior to final
judgment, leave is granted to file exceptions raising these matters. No motion
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trial court's order to be filed within ten days after notice of the filing of the
decision. The court agreed with the defendant and allowed the appeal. 28 Its
decision was based in part on Pennsylvania's version of the UAA527 which
states that applications to the court concerning arbitration shall be by petition.
The court interpreted this to mean that applications to modify or vacate an
arbitrator's award are to be made on petition and are to follow regular petition
rules.529 Thus, an appeal from the court's order in this matter should follow
the same procedure as the appeal from a hearing on a petition in a civil action.
The UAA furthers the policy of encouraging arbitration by permitting
interlocutory appeals from orders denying compulsion of arbitration. This pol-
icy is not served, however, when a court denies an appeal from such an order
when, for example, it finds that an arbitration agreement is invalid. The UAA
also furthers the policy of encouraging arbitration by not allowing interlocu-
tory review of orders compelling arbitration and by permitting parties to seek
review of a court's order modifying, correcting, confirming or denying confir-
mation of an arbitrator's award. By allowing immediate appeals from orders
confirming an arbitrator's award, courts may avoid the possibility of inconsis-
tent holdings.
IX. JURISDICTION
Under the UAA, courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to determine
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists52 9 and to compel"3 or stay 531 ar-
bitration depending on that determination. Courts can also enforce5 3 2 , con-
firm5 33, correct, modify or vacate53 4 the arbitration award. Jurisdiction will lie
with the courts of "competent jurisdiction" 53 5 of the state where the arbitra-
tion occurred, even if the agreement was made in another state.5 3 This is true
for a new trial, for judgment non obstante verdicto, in arrest of judgment or
to remove a nonsuit may be filed.
This rule was rescinded October 19, 1983, effective January 1, 1984. Pa. R.C.P. 227.1,
adopted Oct. 19, 1983 and effective Jan. 1, 1984 now includes these provisions.
526. Haegele, 300 Pa. Super. at -, 479 A.2d at 1008.
527. 42 PA. CONs. STAT. § 7317 (1980).
528. Haegele, 300 Pa. Super. at _ , 479 A.2d at 1009.
529. UAA § 2(a).
530. Id. See, e.g., Manalili v. Commercial Mowing & Grading, 442 So. 2d 411
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (order denying the right to compel arbitration invokes juris-
diction of court of appeals).
531. UAA § 2(b).
532. UAA § 17.
533. UAA § 11. See, e.g., Bromley v. Erie Ins. Group, 322 Pa. Super. 542, 469
A.2d 1124 (1983) (appellate court can confirm award under the standard of review
specified in the arbitration statute).
534. UAA § 12.
535. UAA § 17.
536. State ex rel. Tri-City Constr. v. Marsh, 668 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Mo. Ct.
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unless the courts of that state have been explicitly deprived of jurisdiction by
statute.537 State courts will not have jurisdiction to settle arbitration disputes
when the agreement was entered into before the enactment of the UAA and
the previous state arbitration law did not confer such jurisdiction.538
In State ex rel. Tri-City Construction Co. v. Marsh,3 9 a Missouri appel-
late court held that jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award lies with the
courts of the state where the arbitration took place, rather than with the
courts of the state where the agreement was executed.540 The parties had exe-
cuted an agreement in Kansas providing for arbitration under Kansas' arbitra-
tion act. However, by mutual consent, the parties had undertaken the arbitra-
tion and entered the award in Missouri. The court held that a Missouri court
had jurisdiction to confirm the award, acknowledging that every state that has
considered the question of jurisdiction has focused on the place of arbitration,
rather than on the locus of the agreement.14'
In Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Maurizio,542 a Mich-
igan appellate court held that a state court is not deprived of jurisdiction over
arbitration disputes unless a statute explicitly deprives the court of jurisdic-
tion.543 The defendants pointed to two provisions of Michigan's arbitration
statute 114 from which it could be inferred that jurisdiction of state courts over
arbitration disputes is limited. In holding that jurisdiction is not so limited,5 45
the court reasoned that jurisdiction can be denied only when the statutory
language "leave[s] no doubt that the Legislature intended to deprive the cir-
cuit court of jurisdiction of a particular subject matter. 5648
Similarly, in Architects Collaborative, Inc. v. President and Trustees of
Bates College,547 a Maine federal district court held that a federal court did
not lose jurisdiction merely because it could be inferred from a state arbitra-
App. 1983).
537. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Maurizio, 129 Mich. App. 166, 341
N.W.2d 262 (1983).
538. Medicine Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. J-Pral Corp., 662 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
539. 668 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
540. Id. at 151-52.
541. Id. at 152.
542." 129 Mich. App. 166, 341 N.W.2d 262 (1983).
543. Id. at __ , 341 N.W.2d at 266-67.
544. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(2) (West 1968), similar to UAA § 1,
states in part: "Such an agreement shall stand as a submission to arbitration of any
controversy arising under said contract not expressly exempt from arbitration by the
terms of the contract." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5025 (West 1968), similar to
UAA § 17, states in part: "Upon the making of an agreement described in section
5001, the circuit courts have jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.
545. 341 N.W.2d at 266-67.
546. Id. at 267.
547. 576 F. Supp. 380 (D. Me. 1983).
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tion act that jurisdiction rested only with the state courts.548 The plaintiff, a
corporation principally doing business in Massachusetts, petitioned the federal
district court in Maine to compel arbitration of a dispute with a college lo-
cated in Maine.549 The agreement had provided for arbitration under Massa-
chusetts' arbitration act, 550 from which it could have been concluded that state
courts had exclusive jurisdiction.55 The federal court held that it was not de-
prived of jurisdiction because the act in question only permitted the action to
be brought in state court, and because it did not otherwise display an intent to
limit the forums from which a party could seek relief.
5 52
Illinois courts were explicitly deprived of jurisdiction by statute in Local
3236 of Illinois Federation of State Office Educators v. Illinois State Board
of Education.6 3 The plaintiff, a union of state office educators, brought an
action to compel the defendant board members to arbitrate salary grievances
as provided by the parties' agreement. The defendants had entered into the
agreement on behalf of the state.154 An Illinois appellate court held that, be-
cause the suit was against the state, jurisdiction was controlled by the state
immunity statute, which granted exclusive jurisdiction in such cases to the
Illinois Court of Claims. 5 8
In Medicine Shoppe International, Inc. v. J-Pral Corp.,5"6 a Missouri ap-
pellate court held that a state court does not have jurisdiction when the arbi-
tration agreement in question is governed by a previous state arbitration law
that does not give state courts jurisdiction to enforce such agreements. 557 The
agreement had been executed in 1979, before Missouri enacted the UAA. 
5 8
548. 576 F. Supp. at 382. The federal courts have jurisdiction based on diversity
of citizenship of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
549. 576 F. Supp. at 39O.
550. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (West Supp. 1984). The contract
provided for arbitration under the prevailing arbitration law of the state of plaintiff's
principal place of business. 576 F. Supp. at 382.
551. 576 F. Supp. at 382. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2(a) (West Supp.
1984) provided that an aggrieved party "may apply to the superior court," and § 16
defined "court" to mean any court of competent jurisdiction "of this state." Id.
552. 576 F. Supp. at 382-83. The court specifically declined to hold whether a
state legislature could, if it intended to do so, deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction
over disputes under that state's arbitration act. When the states have attempted to
limit the power of the federal courts, they have almost uniformly been unsuccessful. C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 46, at 273 (4th ed. 1983).
553. 121 Ill. App. 3d 160, 459 N.E.2d 300 (1984).
554. Id. at __, 459 N.E.2d at 301-02.
555. Id. at __, 459 N.E.2d at 304.
556. 662 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
557. Id. at 274.
558. Id. Missouri enacted its version of the UAA in 1980. See Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 435.350-.470 (Cum. Supp. 1984). Missouri's UAA applies only to agreements made
subsequent to the enactment. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.445 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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Missouri's previous arbitration statutes559 had no provision for judicial en-
forcement of arbitration agreements, and Missouri courts had held that they
could not enforce these agreements. 560 The court held that the agreement in
question was governed by the prior law, and therefore, the state courts did not
have jurisdiction over the dispute.561
The issue in Medicine Shoppe was raised as a question of personal juris-
diction, the question being whether the parties by their agreement had con-
sented to the jurisdiction of the Missouri courts.5 62 Generally, by agreeing to
arbitrate in a designated state, the parties are held to have impliedly consented
to that state's jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration agreement.5 63 The court in
Medicine Shoppe, however, decided the issue on the basis of the courts' statu-
tory authority to decide arbitration disputes, which is a matter of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction. 564 Both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction must be pre-
sent before a court can decide a dispute,56 5 and in bringing the suit the issues
should not be confused.
The rules for jurisdiction in arbitration disputes do not differ from those
in other judicial proceedings. The court must have both personal and subject-
matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is obtained through consent of the
parties or sufficient contacts of the parties with the forum state, together with
adequate notice. Subject-matter jurisdiction is obtained directly from statutes.
State courts have plenary jurisdiction; thus, they will have subject-matter ju-
risdiction unless they have been explicitly deprived of it by the arbitration act
or other relevant state statute. The federal courts have limited jurisdiction;
thus, they will have subject-matter jurisdiction only when either the diversity
of citizenship or federal question statutes are satisfied.
X. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Because arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution process favored by
the courts, judicial restraint is exercised in reviewing arbitration proceed-
559. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 435.010-.280 (1978).
560. Medicine Shoppe, 662 S.W.2d at 274 (citing Tureman v. Altman, 361 Mo.
1220, 1229, 239 S.W.2d 304, 309 (1951) (en banc); Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370,
375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606,
610 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963)).
561. 662 S.W.2d at 274. The court also held that a party in an arbitration dis-
pute is not collaterally estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction on the ground
that the issue had been decided in prior arbitration proceedings, when the arbitration
tribunal had not made that determination on the merits of the case. Id. at 275.
562. 662 S.W.2d at 273.
563. Id. (citing Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Com-
merce, 360 F.2d 103, 197 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966)).
564. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 105 (1965).
565. Id.
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ings.56 After the parties have agreed to accept an arbitrator's findings of fact
and view of the law, even an award based on a mistake of fact or law generally
will not be set aside. 567 In making a decision to vacate or confirm an award, a
trial court considers only the specific grounds set forth in its jurisdiction's arbi-
tration statute. 56 8 Appellate courts generally hold that the UAA restricts the
trial court's review of the arbitrator's award but does not impose restrictions
on the appellate court's power to review the trial court's decision.
5 69
In McDonald v. Hardee County School Board,570 the court held that an
arbitrator's award may not be vacated upon a mistake of fact or law but only
upon one of the statutory grounds listed in the UAA.5 7 1 A tenured teacher
who had been dismissed sought to have the arbitrator's award vacated on the
ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers (a ground for vacating
recognized by UAA section 12 (a)(3)). 572 The arbitrator found that the
teacher's conduct was unacceptable, but that the school administration failed
to comply with the required dismissal procedure. Consequently, the award sus-
tained the grievance and it reduced the discipline from discharge to suspension
without pay." The trial court confirmed the award. The teacher contended,
however, that under Florida law a school employee should be reinstated imme-
diately and receive back pay if the charges against him are not sustained . 74
He argued that a finding that the grievance was sustained left the arbitrator
no alternative but to order reinstatement with back pay. In affirming, the ap-
pellate court disagreed, holding that the arbitrator's conclusion that the griev-
ance was sustained (because of procedural irregularities) was not the
equivalent to a finding that the charges against the teacher had not been
sustained. 575
In Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 108 v. Village of Washington
Park,57 6 the court held that under the applicable rules concerning arbitration,
566. Helmerichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co., 349 N.W.2d 326, 327
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
567. Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges, 662 S.W.2d 288, 290
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
568. McDonald v. Hardee County School Bd., 448 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984).
569. Rural Water Dist. No. 6, Butler County v. Ziegler Corp., 9 Kan. App. 2d
305, -, 677 P.2d 573, 578 (1984).
570. 448 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
571. Id. at 594 (citing FLA. STAT. § 682.13 (1981)).
572. UAA § 12(a): "Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an
award where: . . . (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers."
573. 448 So. 2d at 594.
574. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 231.36(6)(1981) which states in part: "... if
charges are not sustained [the teacher] shall be immediately reinstated, and his back
salary shall be paid.").
575. Id. at 595.
576. 123 I11. App. 3d 26, 462 N.E.2d 855 (1984).
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the trial court's review is limited to a determination of whether the plaintiff's
claims are arbitrable. The trial court is thus precluded from ruling on the
merits of the case. 57 An action was brought by the police organization to
compel the village to arbitrate the issue of sick pay for police officers. The
village argued that before the grievance procedures were initiated, the village
had lawfully terminated the collective bargaining agreement which contained
the arbitration clause. The village also contended that the police officers' strike
in violation of the agreement had given the city the right to terminate the
agreement unilaterally.578 The circuit court ordered the village to submit to
arbitration. The court explained that the only issue before it was whether the
plaintiffs had a right to arbitrate the question of sick pay and not whether the
police officers' actions constituted a strike which barred them from receiving
such benefits. 579 The appellate court held that the lower court properly limited
its inquiry to the arbitrability of the plaintiffs' claims. 580
In Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Boston Carmen's
Union, Division 589,581 the court explained that an arbitrator's award may be
unassailable even if re-examination suggests that it is wrong in fact, or in law,
or both (including errors in the interpretation of agreements and statutes). It
pointed out, however, that such awards are still open to oblique attacks that
are in a sense jurisdictional. For example, a party may argue that public pol-
icy should prevent the delegation of some issues to arbitration.582 The Massa-
chusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Authority) decided to furnish special
services for the elderly and handicapped by contracting with a non-profit cor-
poration (THEM) to operate a "dial-a-ride" service (Ride). When Ride be-
came a large, permanent operation, the Union called on the Authority to rec-
ognize the service as Union work within the collective bargaining agreement.
After a hearing, the arbitrator found that the Authority had violated the
agreement by contracting with THEM and ordered it to assign the work to
Union employees.583
On appeal, the Authority argued that part of the arbitrator's finding was
outside the permissible scope of arbitration. The court, however, held that the
portion of the finding thus criticized was surplusage and that, even if it was
not, the scope of arbitration had been extended by consent when the Authority
had failed to protest at the hearing.584 In response to the Authority's policy
argument that the Urban Mass Transportation Act was meant to discourage
577. Id. at _, 462 N.E.2d at 858 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, par. 102
(1979)).
578. Id. at , 462 N.E.2d at 857.
579. Id.
580. Id. at ,462 N.E.2d at 858.
581. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 455 N.E.2d 1231 (1983), review denied 390 Mass.
1106, 459 N.E.2d 824 (1984).
582. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1234.
583. Id.
584. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1235.
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state agencies from using federal funds to compete with private transportation,
the court concluded that the Authority had so taken control of THEM that
THEM was no longer a private company.5 85 Consequently, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's confirmation of the award. 58 6
In Wicomico County Education Association, Inc. v. Board of Educa-
tion,587 the court held that the Maryland UAA does not sanction a modifica-
tion of an arbitrator's award merely because there is a bald allegation that it
was based on a factual error not apparent on the face of the award. 588 Red-
dish, a teacher who had not been hired for a coaching position, asked the court
to modify or correct the arbitrator's factual finding that there had been two
qualified applicants for the coaching position. Reddish and the teachers' col-
lective bargaining agent, WCEA, claimed that there was no testimony that
anyone except Reddish had applied for the position. However, no transcript of
the arbitration proceedings had been made, and the circuit court entered judg-
ment in favor of the Board.589 Reddish and WCEA appealed, arguing that the
judge should have taken testimony to determine whether evidence before the
arbitrator established that there was more than one applicant. The appellate
court held that the teacher's failure to request that a transcript be made
should not be converted to his advantage by granting him a trial de novo at
the trial court level. The court explained that if the law were otherwise, the
arbitration hearing would be merely a first airing of the evidence rather than
the termination of the evidentiary phase of the dispute.590 The court pointed
out that without a transcript, the circuit court had no way to determine
whether particular evidence was presented to the arbitrator. Although the
court recognized the parties' reluctance to incur the expense of having a tran-
script made unnecessarily, the court noted that the cost of taping an arbitra-
tion proceeding would not be prohibitive and that, when required, a transcript
could subsequently be prepared.5 9 '
In Helmerichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co.,5" the court stated
that the arbitrators' award should be set aside only when the objecting party
meets its burden of proof that the arbitrators have clearly exceeded the powers
granted to them in the arbitration agreement. Courts should not overturn an
award merely because they disagree with the arbitrators' decision on the mer-
its.593 Helmerich, a former president of the bank, demanded arbitration pursu-
585. Id.
586. Id. at -, 455 N.E.2d at 1236.
587. 59 Md. Ct. Spec. App. 564, 477 A.2d 279 (1984).
588. Id. at 589, 477 A.2d at 281 (interpreting MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-223(b) (1974)).
589. Id. at 566, 477 A.2d at 280.
590. Id. at 567-68, 477 A.2d at 280-81.
591. Id. at 568, 477 A.2d at 281.
592. 349 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Children's Hosp., Inc., v.
Minnesota Nurses Ass'n, 265 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. 1978)).
593. 349 N.W.2d at 328.
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ant to his employment contract. After the arbitrator entered an award in his
favor, the bank argued, in a post-hearing brief, that the illegality of the em-
ployment contract voided the arbitration clause. The circuit court held that
the bank's objection to arbitrability was untimely made, and it confirmed the
award. " 4 The appellate court held that the trial court's finding that the ques-
tion of arbitrability was raised only in a one-sentence paragraph in a post-
hearing brief submitted to the arbitrators was not clearly erroneous. The court
concluded that allowing a party to claim, after the hearing is over, that there
was no agreement to arbitrate results in a waste of time and money.595
In Rustad v. Rustad" 6 the court held that it always retains ultimate au-
thority to review and modify arbitration awards involving custody and child
support, but parties may agree initially to submit such controversies to an ar-
bitrator. After the Rustads had gone to court to obtain a divorce, they signed
an agreement to arbitrate any future issues of spousal and child support. Nev-
ertheless, the husband subsequently went to court to reduce his support obliga-
tion. The wife moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the parties were
contractually bound to submit to arbitration. The court held that it retained
jurisdiction over the matter and, consequently, arbitration was not a necessary
precondition to litigation.591 On appeal, the appellate court held that the wife's
motion for arbitration was properly denied. By submitting themselves initially
to the jurisdiction of the court in their controversy over custody, the parties
foreclosed their right to enter into a subsequent arbitration agreement. When
they later agreed to arbitrate disputes, including child support, their agree-
ment was void ab initio.5"8
In AFSCME District Council 96 v. Independent School District 381,5 9
the court ruled that when the parties have agreed to avail themselves of the
benefits of arbitration, judicial interference should be kept to a minimum. For
that reason, courts which are reviewing arbitration awards should be deferen-
tial to the arbitrator's decision. 00 Four teachers' aides requested that seniority
be determined from their dates of hire rather than from the dates of their
joining AFSCME, the employees's exclusive bargaining representative. When
the school board agreed, AFSCME filed a grievance concerning the board's
action, and the matter went to arbitration. The arbitrator determined that
under this particular collective bargaining agreement, seniority was to be
credited not from the length of service with the employer but from the time
within the bargaining unit."" The district court affirmed the arbitrator's deci-
594. Id. at 327.
595. Id. at 328.
596. 68 N.C. App. 58, 314 S.E.2d 275 (1984).
597. Id. at __, 314 S.E.2d at 277.
598. Id. at __, 314 S.E.2d at 277-78.
599. 351 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
600. Id. at 35.
601. Id. at 34.
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sion, and the employees appealed, claiming that the arbitrators exceeded their
powers. The appellate court held that an award is appropriate so long as the
interpretation can be derived in some rational manner from the agreement.
The court explained that a reviewing court can disturb an arbitration award
only where there has been such obvious disregard of the agreement that the
award is totally unsupported by the usual principles of contract construc-
tion. 60o Applying those standards, the court affirmed the district court's
decision .63
In Eisen v. Minnesota,"4 the court ruled that the UAA ordinarily governs
authority and procedure for judicial review of an arbitration proceeding, but if
the UAA is silent regarding a particular matter, the court must look to the
collective bargaining agreement."0 5 Eisen, an employee of Faribault State Hos-
pital, was discharged for allegedly slapping a patient. At the subsequent arbi-
tration hearing, Eisen was represented by his union representative. The arbi-
trator issued an award in favor of the employer, and the union decided not to
appeal. Eisen then retained an attorney to appeal the matter to the district
court. 60 6 The court vacated the award and ordered a rehearing before another
arbitrator. The employer appealed that decision, claiming that Eisen did not
have standing as a party to seek vacation of the arbitration award."0 7 Because
the UAA does not define "party" for purposes of an appeal, the appellate
court looked to the collective bargaining agreement for a definition and deter-
mined that under the agreement the union and not the individual employee
was a party to the arbitration proceedings. 60 8
In Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges,'0 9 the court
stated that the purpose of the UAA is to afford the parties the opportunity to
reach a final disposition of differences in an easier and more expeditious man-
ner than by litigation. Consequently, judicial review of arbitration awards is
severely limited.610 An arbitration award of $92,500 was entered in favor of
602. Id. at 35 (quoting Ramsey County v. AFSCME, Council 91, Local 8, 309
N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1983)).
603. 351 N.W.2d at 35.
604. 352 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1984) (en banc).
605. Id. at 734.
606. Id. at 733.
607. Id. at 734.
608. Id. at 734-35. The appellate court also reasoned that just as a non-organ-
ized employer can accept an employee's waiver of any challenge to his discharge as a
final resolution of the matter, an organized employer should be able to rely on a com-
parable waiver made by the employee's exclusive representative. Id. at 735. The court
held that, unless the collective bargaining agreement provides otherwise, an individual
employee may not appeal an unfavorable award where the union expressly determines
not to appeal. This policy, however, does not foreclose the employee's right of action
against a union which fails to fairly represent his interests. Id at 738.
609. 662 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
610. Id. at 291.
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Lindenwood Colleges and against Western, the installer of a defective soccer
field. The trial court confirmed the award. Western appealed, claiming that
the arbitrators had found Lindenwood guilty of contributory negligence in
overwatering the field and that, under Missouri law, a finding of contributory
negligence bars an action for breach of an implied warranty. Western argued
that in making such a mistake of law, the arbitrators had exceeded their pow-
ers.6" ' The court held, however, that a mistake of law or an erroneous interpre-
tation of the law by the arbitrators does not constitute an act in excess of their
powers under the UAA. 61 2 In any event, the court found that Western and not
the arbitrators had misinterpreted Missouri law and that the award was not
based on an error of law."'
In House Grain Co. v. Obst, 614 a Texas court of appeals held that a
mistake of fact or law is not enough to set aside the arbitration award. 6 5 Obst
contracted to sell corn to House Grain Company. When a dispute arose over
the amount of corn contracted for, the parties voluntarily submitted to arbitra-
tion. The arbitrators found that Obst should have shipped twice as much corn
according to the standard of interpretation of the contract. Obst then peti-
tioned the trial court, which reversed the arbitrators' decision. House Grain
Company then appealed.616 Since the award was based on the proper interpre-
tation of the terms of the contract and no impropriety was shown by the evi-
dence, the court affirmed the arbitrators' decision.6 1 7
In International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. In-
gram Manufacturing Co.,6O" the Fifth Circuit held that absent a showing of
fraud, bias, or prejudice, the courts have no power to review an arbitrator's
findings of fact.619 Following a strike by employees of Ingram Manufacturing
Co., a dispute arose concerning striking employees who had been permanently
replaced. The union claimed that there was an agreement that all striking
employees would be recalled even if permanent replacements had been
hired.62 '0 The company denied the agreement. When the issue was arbitrated,
an award was given to the employees. Upon petition, both the trial and appel-
611. Id. at 290.
612. Id. at 291.
613. Id. at 292-93. Western also asserted that the award should be set aside
under the Federal Arbitration Act because it constituted a manifest disregard of the
law. The court explained that an arbitrator's award should not be set aside on that
ground unless the complaining party shows that the arbitrator understood and correctly
stated the law but nevertheless ignored it. The court held that it found no error of law
and certainly not a manifest disregard of the law. Id. at 292.
614. 659 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 19g3).
615. Id. at 906.
616. Id. at 905-06.
617. Id. at 908.
618. 715 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S.Ct. 1711 (1984).
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late courts found that the decision was within the authority given by the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The question of interpretation of the agreement
is for the arbitrator, and as long as the decision involves construction of the
contract, the courts have no business overruling the arbitrator. 2 Since the
main issue in the case was whether a reinstatement agreement existed between
the union and Ingram, it was an issue of fact and not subject to review.62'
In Iowa City Community School District v. Iowa City Education Associ-
ation,623 the court noted that unless something in a contract provides positive
assurance that a dispute is not arbitrable, the arbitrator's interpretation and
award is not subject to review."" A teacher was not allowed to benefit from an
"across the board" pay increase because of his alleged unsatisfactory service in
the classroom. The teachers' association pursued grievance measures and re-
ceived a favorable arbitration decision for the teacher. The school district con-
tended that the arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. 62 5 The Supreme Court of Iowa said that so long as the
arbitrator's interpretation can in some rational manner be derived from the
agreement, it is not subject to review.62 6 In this case the arbitrator's decision
was well within the principles applied in upholding arbitration awards.6 2
Under the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act, a mistake of law is grounds for
reversal or modification.6 2 8 In Haegele v. Pennsylvania General Insurance
Co.,62 9 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania modified an arbitration award to
make the award conform with state law. Linda Haegele was killed while rid-
ing in an automobile owned by Kaisinger. Kaisinger's insurance company paid
the maximum amount allowed under Kaisinger's insurance policy, but the
payment was less than the claimed damages. Since Linda was covered under
her father's policy with Pennsylvania General Insurance Company, Linda's es-
tate filed a claim with that company to collect uninsured motorist benefits.630
After a dispute and submission to arbitration, an award was made which al-
lowed the Haegele estate to combine or "stack" 31 the insurance coverage of
621. Id. at 892.
622. Id. at 891.
623. 343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1983).
624. Id. at 144.
625. Id. at 142.
626. Id. at 144 (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Oil, Chemical & Chemical Workers
Int'l Union, Local 7-1, Inc., 548 F.2d 1288, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977)).
627. 343 N.W.2d at 145.
628. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(a)(2) (Purdon 1982).
629. 479 A.2d 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
630. Id. at 1006.
631. When an insurance policy covers more than one vehicle, certain classes of
people under specified circumstances can "add up" or "stack" the coverage of those
vehicles. Thus if each of ten vehicles had a $10,000 liability limit, the coverage would
be $100,000 if "stacking" were allowed. For a discussion of stacking of insurance cov-
erage, see Comment, Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 49 Mo. L. REv. 571
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multiple vehicles covered by the Pennsylvania General policy.6 2 This award
was affirmed in the trial court, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania over-
ruled the trial court and found that the award was in violation of Pennsylvania
law.633 The Haegele's insurance policy contained a valid and enforceable pro-
vision which prevented "stacking," so the award was modified to conform with
state law.63
4
In the very similar case of Flamini v. General Accident Fire & Life As-
surance Co.,635 the court said that when Pennsylvania'sUAA governs a dis-
pute, the arbitrator's decision is reviewable by the courts as to matters of
law.6 36 In that case, Flamini, a police officer, was injured as a result of his
patrol car being struck by a hit-and-run driver. Flamini sought compensation
from the police fleet's insurer and a dispute arose as to "stacking" the cover-
age of the fleet vehicles. The dispute was arbitrated and "stacking" was al-
lowed, but when Flamini sought confirmation of the award, the trial court
modified the award, disallowing the "stacking" as a matter of law. 3 7 The su-
perior court affirmed the modification, saying that the arbitrator's allowance of
"stacking" was an error of law under the facts of the case." 8
Another Pennsylvania case applied the same principle. In Pennsylvania
State Education Association v. Appalachia Intermediate Unit 08,639 the court
noted that great deference is given to arbitrators' awards. Unless the award
violates a law it shall stand, provided it could rationally be derived from the
collective bargaining agreement. The case involved a strike which caused state
special education employees to miss several days of work. Appellee did not
reschedule the missed days of work. The arbitrator ordered the state to pay
the employees for the missed work days, with interest compounded annually
on the missed wages.640 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion, but changed the interest to simple interest, saying the law in Pennsylva-
nia permits compound interest only when it is explicitly provided for by con-
tract or statute. 641
In Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Contrisciane,642 the court said that
where an arbitrator's award is against the law and is such that had it been a
jury verdict, the court would have entered a different or other judgment not-
(1984); Comment, Stacked Recovery Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement of
the Automobile Liability Policy, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 135 (1974).
632. Haegele, 479 A.2d at 1006.
633. Id. at 1011.
634. Id.
635. - Pa. Super. -, 477 A.2d 508 (1984).
636. Id. at - 477 A.2d at 511.
637. Id. at __, 477 A.2d at 509-11.
638. Id. at , 477 A.2d at 514.
639. - Pa. __ , 476 A.2d 360 (1984).
640. Id. at __, 476 A.2d at 361-62.
641. Id. at -, 476 A.2d at 363.
642. 504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005 (1984).
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withstanding the verdict, the court has grounds for modifying or correcting the
award.6 43 Kenneth Contrisciane was killed while standing beside a police car
at the scene of a minor traffic accident in which Contrisciane had been in-
volved. The driver of the car which hit and killed Contrisciane was uninsured.
Contrisciane's estate sought recovery from the insurer of the car Contrisciane
had been driving. When arbitrators concluded that Contrisciane was not occu-
pying the car at the time of his death, and thus was not covered under the
policy, the estate appealed." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that
the construction of individual terms of the insurance policy was a matter of
law which was subject to review. Subsequently, the court found that Contris-
ciane was occupying the vehicle for insurance purposes, thereby affirming the
trial court's reversal of the arbitrator's decision on that issue. 45
In Bromley v. Erie Insurance Group,646 the court held that the scope of
judicial review under Pennsylvania's version of the UAA is broader than at
common law, and thus under the statute, an arbitrator's award can be vacated
for a mistake of law.647 Bromley and his wife were seriously injured in an
automobile accident. The driver of another car involved in the accident was
negligent and his insurance company paid the policy limit amount, but the
Bromleys were not compensated fully for their injuries. The Bromleys subse-
quently sought additional benefits from their own insurer, Erie, under the un-
insured motorist policy provision. The arbitrators granted the Bromleys an
award and the trial court affirmed " 8 On appeal, the Superior Court held that
underinsured motorists cannot be equated with uninsured motorists.149 Since
the negligent driver was insured in compliance with state law, the arbitrators
made a mistake of law in awarding compensation under the uninsured clause
of Erie's insurance policy. Consequently, the Superior Court vacated the
award because it was contrary to law.650
In Whitt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 51 the court found that reso-
lution of factual disputes is solely within the province of the arbitrator, espe-
cially when the court has no transcript with which to evaluate the evidence
and the findings.6 52 Whitt filed a grievance with arbitrators after her housing
unit fell into disrepair. She received an award which was later confirmed by
the trial court. The award included abatement of rent until certain repairs
were made. The landlord ignored the arbitration award, but did make some
repairs and gave Whitt a termination notice for non-payment of rent. Whitt
643. Id. at __, 473 A.2d at 1008.
644. Id. at , 473 A.2d at 1007.
645. Id. at __, 473 A.2d at 1009.
646. 322 Pa. Super. 542, 469 A.2d 1124 (1983).
647. Id. at , 469 A.2d at 1128.
648. Id. at , 469 A.2d at 1126.
649. Id. at _ ,469 A.2d at 1128.
650. Id.
651. 325 Pa. Super. 135, 472 A.2d 684 (1984).
652. Id. at __, 472 A.2d at 689.
[Vol. 1985
70
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1985, Iss.  [1985], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/11
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
appealed a second time to the arbitration board, but because of change of
circumstances the board awarded Whitt significantly less than in the previous
award. Whitt then tried to have the second award vacated or modified because
it did not seem justified in light of the first award.653 The Superior Court
found that the second award was based on conclusions of fact; that the draw-
ing of such conclusions is within the authority of the arbitrators, and that
since Whitt sought a second decision from the arbitrators, she was bound by
their decision. 6
In Cargill v. Northwestern National Insurance Co.,655 the court applied
common law principles, upholding arbitration awards despite mistakes of fact
or law.6 56 Cargill was injured in an automobile accident. When the responsible
insurer and Cargill could not agree on the amount of the claim, the dispute
was submitted to arbitration. The insurer included the wrong cover sheet with
the insurance policy when they submitted it to arbitration. As a result, the
arbitrators' award to Cargill was in excess of the policy limits. Northwestern
petitioned for vacation or modification on the grounds that the award was ex-
cessive; Cargill petitioned for confirmation of the award. 5 7 The lower court
confirmed the award. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
because the arbitrators had acted under the common law. The court held that,
in common law arbitration, the arbitrators' award is conclusive as to law or
fact, and is not subject to reversal for a mistake of either.6" 8
Another common law arbitration case was Gentile v. Weiss, 59 where the
court held that the arbitrators' decision is binding unless it is shown that a
party was denied a hearing, or there was misconduct, fraud, corruption, or
other irregularity resulting in an unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable
award. 6 0 Gentile and Weiss, after disputing termination provisions of a con-
struction contract, were ordered to arbitration under the terms of the contract.
The arbitrators granted an award to Gentile. Weiss petitioned to have the
award corrected or modified on the basis that it was wrong as a matter of law.
The trial court denied Weiss's motion, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed. The court reasoned that unless the parties specifically agree upon
statutory arbitration, common law arbitration principles apply.66 ' Since the
terms of the contract did not provide for statutory arbitration, the common
law applied and thus, errors of law were not reviewable. 6 2
653. Id. at __, 472 A.2d at 686.
654. Id. at __, 472 A.2d at 688.
655. 316 Pa. Super. 139, 462 A.2d 833 (1983).
656. Id. at __, 462 A.2d at 835.
657. Id. at , 462 A.2d at 834.
658. Id. at __, 462 A.2d at 835.
659. 328 Pa. Super. 475, 477 A.2d 544 (1984).
660. Id. at __, 477 A.2d at 546.
661. Id. at , 477 A.2d at 545-46.
662. Id. at __., 477 A.2d at 546.
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Courts conduct only a limited review of arbitration proceedings and will
not overturn an award merely because they disagree with the arbitrator's deci-
sion on the merits. Consequently, appellants usually attempt to attack awards
on grounds that are "extra-jurisdictional," such as a claim that the arbitrator
exceeded his powers. Even in those cases, the courts make every presumption
in favor of the validity of the award.
If arbitration awards are not given finality, arbitration fails its primary
purpose. Instead of being a speedy and efficient substitute for litigation, it be-
comes merely the beginning of litigation. Judicial reconsideration of arbitra-
tion awards would delay final decisions rather than bring controversies to a
speedy resolution. Accordingly, courts justifiably conduct a very limited review
of arbitration awards.
XI. TIMELINESS
Under the UAA, applications to vacate an arbitrator's award must be
made within ninety days after the award is made. 63 However, if the motion to
vacate is based on allegations of "corruption, fraud or other undue means,"
the ninety-day period does not begin to run until "such grounds are known or
should have been known."66 4 The UAA does not specify any other exceptions
to this limitations period. Likewise, applications to modify or correct an award
must be made within ninety days after the award is made.66 5 The limitation
period normally begins to run when a copy of the award is delivered to the
applicant.666 Recent cases indicate that application of the UAA's statute of
limitations is inappropriate in actions brought by employees under section 301
of the National Labor Management Relations Act 6 7 to enforce a labor arbi-
tration award made under a collective bargaining agreement. 6 8
A. Vacation
In Bernstein v. Grammercy Mills, Inc.,66 the Massachusetts Appeals
Court held that the form in which an attack on an arbitration award is made
(in this case as a "counterclaim" in an action for confirmation) does not save a
motion for vacation that would otherwise be time-barred. Plaintiff claimed




666. UAA § 12(b), 13(a).
667. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1978).
668. DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); Bar-
nett v. United Airlines, 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1984); Hand v. Int'l Chemical Work-
ers Union, 712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983).
669. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 452 N.E.2d 231 (1983).
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awarded the plaintiff approximately one-half the amount he sought. 670 After
the defendant refused to pay the award, the plaintiff filed a petition for confir-
mation and enforcement. In reply, the defendant counterclaimed for vacation
of the award, charging that an arbitrator had improperly failed to disclose his
connections with one of the plaintiff's attorneys. 67 The plaintiff denied the
substance of the defendant's challenge and further argued that it was time-
barred, having been raised more than thirty days after the effective date of the
award.6 72 The trial court confirmed the award on the merits. On appeal, the
court held that the "counterclaim" was time-barred and that neither the fact
that the attack on the award was nominally a counterclaim nor the fact that it
was made in response to a petition for confirmation exempted the defendant's
prayer for vacation from the time limits imposed on such attacks.6 73 The de-
fendant also argued that its claim was exempt from the normal time limits by
virtue of a statute 7 4 that excepts compulsory counterclaims from the general
statutes of limitations. 7 5 The appellate court rejected that argument, noting
that even if the defendant's challenge to the award was a compulsory counter-
claim within the contemplation of the statute, the provisions of the arbitration
act, intended to "flush out objections to awards with dispatch," would
control.676
In Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Clementi,677 an Illinois appellate court held that
the ninety-day limit for the assertion of grounds for the vacation of an award
is not extended by either the filing of a motion for confirmation or by the trial
court's giving the answering party twenty-one days to file a response to such
motion. The parties to a lease agreement concerning coin-operated washing
machines submitted a dispute over the lease to arbitration. 678 The arbitrators
resolved the dispute in favor of the plaintiff, who then filed a motion for confir-
mation. Over five months after the entry of the award, the defendant moved
the trial court to vacate the award on the ground that no valid lease existed.
The trial court had previously granted the defendant's request for an addi-
tional twenty-one days in which to answer the plaintiff's petition for confirma-
670. Id. at , 452 N.E.2d at 232.
671. Id. at , 452 N.E.2d at 233.
672. The time limit for assertion of grounds for vacation of an award in Massa-
chusetts is thirty days, rather than the ninety-day period provided for in UAA § 12(b).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 12(b) (West Supp. 1984).
673. Bernstein, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at -, 452 N.E.2d at 234.
674. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 36 (West Supp. 1984).
675. Bernstein, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at -, 452 N.E.2d at 235.
676. Id. The appellate court also agreed with the court below that the social
contacts alleged by the defendant to have existed between one of the plaintiff's attor-
neys and a member of the arbitration panel were not sufficient to support a claim of
partiality. id. at -, 452 N.E.2d at 237.
677. 120 II1. App. 3d 892, 458 N.E.2d 1057 (1983).
678. Id. at 894, 458 N.E.2d at 1059.
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tion. 79 The trial court's extension of time in which to file an answer did not,
however, extend the ninety-day time limit for the assertion of grounds for va-
cation, nor did the filing of the petition for confirmation toll the running of the
limit. Consequently, the defendant was barred from raising the issue of
whether there existed a legal basis for the award. 6 0
B. Modification
In Minnesota Licensed Practical Nurses Association v. Bemidji, 8 ' the
court strictly enforced the ninety-day time limit for seeking a modification of
an award.682 One year after receiving a favorable arbitration award, plaintiff
brought an action against her employer for back pay and immediate place-
ment as a full-time employee. The court held that the motion was untimely
because plaintiff had waited nearly a year before filing her application for a
modification of the award. 8 3
C. Federal Cause of Action
When a federal statute involving arbitration does not specify a statute of
limitations, the courts in some cases have looked to the UAA to supply one. 84
However, recent cases indicate that in some instances the UAA is not the
appropriate source from which to borrow a limitation period for a federal
cause of action. One such case is Barnett v. United Airlines,"' where the
plaintiff asserted two claims pursuant to the Railway Labor Act 86 in connec-
tion with a dispute over the terms of his employment. The plaintiff claimed
that his employer had breached the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
and that his union had breached its duty to handle properly his grievance
against his employer. 6 7 Because the Railway Labor Act contains no provision
for a statute of limitations on this type of claim, the district court applied the
ninety-day limitations period of Colorado's arbitration act.68 The court of ap-
peals, however, relying on DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Team-
679. Id. at 896, 458 N.E.2d at 1060.
680. Id. at 896, 458 N.E.2d at 1061.
681. 352 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
682. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.20(1) (West Supp. 1984).
683. Bemidji, 352 N.W.2d at 67.
684. See, e.g., United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), in which
the Supreme Court applied the UAA's ninety-day statute of limitations to a claim
brought by an employee under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (I), charging his employer with breach of a collective bargaining
agreement.
685. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1984).
686. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1976).
687. 738 F.2d at 360.
688. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-214(2) (Supp. 1982).
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sters,"6 9 held that the appropriate statute of limitations for the plaintiff's "hy-
brid" claim was to be found in the National Labor Relations Act, 90 not the
state's arbitration act.691
Another recent case illustrating the appropriate source of a limitations
period for a federal cause of action involving arbitration is Hand v. Interna-
tional Chemical Workers Union.92 Hand involved a claim against an em-
ployer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement and a claim against a
union for breach of the duty of fair representation.6 93 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals originally held that Florida's ninety-day statute of limita-
tions for vacation of an arbitration award applied to the claim. 94 However, on
the basis of DelCostello, the court vacated its first decision and held that the
six-month statute of limitations found in Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act69 applied to the plaintiff's cause of action. 9
To promote finality, courts require timely filing of any challenges to arbi-
tration awards. The UAA's ninety-day limitation period on petitions to vacate,
modify, or correct arbitration awards has been strictly enforced, and normally
may not be extended by the trial court. The ninety-day limitations period has
been held inappropriate, however, in certain labor cases where an employee
alleges breach of a collective bargaining agreement by the employer and
breach of the duty of fair representation by the union.
XII. PREEMPTION
In the recent decision of Southland Corp. v. Keating,6 the United States
Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act 98 (FAA) preempted a
provision of the California Franchise Investment Law69 9 which required litiga-
tion of claims brought under the act. The extent of the federal preemption,
however, is not clear from the Court's opinion. The Court stated that "[iln
689. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In DelCostello, the court refused to follow Mitchell,
discussed supra note 684. The court determined that the interests at stake in an em-
ployee's claim against his employer and union in a fair representation case were best
served by applying the six-month statute of limitations from section 10(b) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982), instead of the ninety-day stat-
ute of limitations from the UAA.
690. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982), which provides for a six-month statute of limi-
tations for filing unfair labor practice charges.
691. 738 F.2d at 364.
692. 712 F.2d 1350 (1ith Cir. 1983).
693. Hand v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 681 F.2d 1308, 13 10 (11 th Cir. 1982).
694. Id. at 1313.
695. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
696. 712 F.2d at 1351.
697. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
698. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
699. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 31000-516 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
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creating a substantive rule [the FAA] applicable in state as well as federal
courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut
the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 7 0 0 Consequently, Southland has
the effect of making most "arbitration agreements specifically enforceable na-
tionwide in state as well as federal courts. 7 0 1 Recently, Southland has been
interpreted by courts considering the extent of preemption of state statutes,
including arbitration statutes, by the FAA.
In Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Construction Co.,702 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Southland to invalidate a Texas stat-
ute 70 3 which precluded arbitration of claims asserted under the statute. Com-
merce Park and Mardian executed a contract which included an arbitration
clause for claims and disputes arising out of or relating to the contract. When
Commerce Park rejected part of Mardian's work, Mardian sought arbitration
and Commerce Park, in turn, filed suit.7 0 The federal district court granted
Mardian's motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration and Commerce Park
appealed.
70 5
The Fifth Circuit faced three issues. First, Commerce Park claimed that
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act 70 ,
(DTPA) its right to sue could not be waived.70 7 Any provision to the contrary,
Commerce Park claimed, was void and unenforceable as against public pol-
icy.708 The court rejected this contention, holding that enforcement of the
700. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 861.
701. Note, Federal Preemption of Arbitration, 1984 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
193 (1984). Although arbitration clauses are to be specifically enforced under the
FAA, the question remains as to which other provisions of the FAA must be applied by
state courts. See id. at 203.
702. 729 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1984).
703. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
704. 727 F.2d at 336. Suit was originally filed in state court and then removed to
federal district court. Id.
705. Id. at 336-37. Holding the order appealable, the court stated:
Both an order staying an action pending arbitration and an order staying ar-
bitration, though interlocutory, are appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
as orders similar to an injunction if (1) the action in which the order was
made is an action which would have been an action at law prior to the fusion
of law and equity; and (2) the stay was sought to permit the prior determina-
tion of an equitable defense.
Id. at 337 (quoting Coastal Indus. Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d
375, 377 n.l (5th Cir. 1981)).
706. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
707. 729 F.2d at 337.
708. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides
that a consumer may maintain a cause of action when any of the specified events under
that section causes actual damage. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon
Supp. 1984) provides that any waiver of the provisions of the Texas Deceptive Trade
[Vol. 1985
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DPTA waiver provision would abrogate section 2 of the FAA7"9 and violate
the supremacy clause. 710 Second, Commerce Park challenged the district
court's conclusion that the dispute was arbitrable. The court also rejected this
claim, holding that since arbitrability of claims is decided on the basis of the
contract and the arbitration clause in this case was broad enough to cover the
claims, the district court was correct in its determination.7 1' Finally, the court
rejected Commerce Park's argument that the non-arbitrable and arbitrable
claims were so "intertwined" that no issue should be resolved through arbitra-
tion. The court noted that the "intertwining doctrine" is a narrow exception to
the "otherwise strictly-construed mandate of section 3" of the FAA."' This
exception is properly applied only where an action states claims both under
state and federal law, and the federal action is not subject to arbitration. In
such situations, the competing federal policies of encouraging arbitration and
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction "are resolved in favor of litigation. 713
Commerce Park argued that the Texas DTPA no-waiver provision was analo-
gous to the federal laws which preempt arbitration. The court held, however,
that in this case of actual conflict between state and federal regulations, where
compliance with both was a physical impossibility, federal preemption by sec-
tion 3 of the FAA was automatic. 714
In Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc. v. Brown,7 1 5 the court held that
if a party seeks arbitration under a state arbitration act and does not assert its
rights under the FAA, the state court decision denying arbitration will be
given res judicata effect. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment in California
state court that certain terms of a shareholder agreement were unenforceable.
The defendant filed a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to California's
arbitration act."' The state court denied the petition and the defendant ap-
Practices-Consumer Protection Act is against public policy and void. Thus, an arbitra-
tion clause precluding litigation of the DTPA claims was void as against public policy.
709. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. For a discussion of the grounds for revocation of an arbitration clause, see Note,
Federal Preemption of Arbitration, 1984 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 193, 200-03 (1984).
710. 729 F.2d at 338.
711. Id. at 338-39.
712. Id. at 339. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) provides that, on the application of one of
the parties, the court shall stay the trial until the arbitrable issue is arbitrated.
713. 729 F.2d at 339.
714. Id. at 339-40.
715. 732 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1984).
716. Id. at 353. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280 (West 1982).
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pealed. While the appeal was pending, the defendant filed a petition in federal
district court to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA and to stay the Cali-
fornia proceeding. Before the district court reached a decision, the California
Court of Appeals affirmed the state court decision on the ground that the Cali-
fornia Labor Code prohibited arbitration of disputes involving employee com-
pensation. The district court then granted the petition to compel arbitration
and stay the state proceedings. 71
7
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
ruled that the California decision would be given res judicata effect in Califor-
nia and must be given the same effect in the federal district court under the
full faith and credit clause.71 8 In reaching this decision, the Third Circuit
stated that the California decision was incorrect because under Southland, the
FAA applied and the federal right to arbitration was superior to the state
right created under the California Labor Code. The court reasoned, however,
that the failure to apply federal law was an error of law7 19 and did not affect
the res judicata effect of the decision. 7 0 The court also rejected the defen-
dant's argument that the California decision violated the supremacy clause.
The court distinguished Southland from the case at bar, since the defendant
had never asserted its rights under the FAA. The decision did not violate the
supremacy clause since it only addressed the issue of the federal right to arbi-
tration versus the state right to a judicial forum. The court pointed out that
the defendant could have asserted its rights under the FAA in the state
court.7 2 ' The FAA will preempt a state act as to the enforceability of an arbi-
tration agreement, but the party seeking to compel arbitration must assert its
rights under the federal act.
In Speck v. Oppenheimer & Co., 722 the court compelled arbitration under
a contract involving interstate commerce, even though the dispute would not
have been arbitrable under state law. 72" The plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant brokerage house in six counts. Two counts were based on federal
securities law, while the other four counts were based on state statutory and
common law. The defendant moved to compel arbitration of the non-federal
claims and to stay arbitration of those claims pending resolution of the federal
claims. 724 In granting the defendant's motion, the court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that Missouri law ought to control since the claimswere based on
state statutory and common law. The plaintiff relied on case law and Missouri
Revised Statute sections 435.010 and 435.460 for the proposition that Mis-
717. 732 F.2d at 347.
718. Id. at 350.
719. Id. at 348.
720. Id. at 351.
721. Id.
722. 583 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
723. Id. at 328.
724. Id. at 326-27.
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souri courts would not enforce the arbitration agreement. 72 5 The court, how-
ever, stated that Missouri law was not applicable regardless of whether Mis-
souri would allow arbitration. 726 The court relied on Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co.""" as authority for two propositions.
First, section 2 of the FAA creates a "body of federal law" that applies to any
contract involving interstate commerce. Second, the FAA policy favoring arbi-
tration takes priority over "state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.' '7
18
In Garmo v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc.,7 2 9 the court followed South-
land, holding that arbitration clauses in brokerage agreements must be en-
forced pursuant to the FAA.7 30 Customers brought suit against their securities
broker, alleging violations of the Consumer Protection Act, Securities Act, and
various common law causes of action. 73 1 The customers had previously signed
an agreement to settle any contract disputes by arbitration." 2 The trial court
ruled that the customers' common law claims were subject to arbitration under
the agreement, but their Consumer Protection and Securities Act claims were
subject to judicial determination. 733 The Supreme Court of Washington re-
versed the lower court and held that the FAA mandates that all claims, both
statutory and non-statutory, be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
brokerage agreement.7 3 4
In Xaphes v. Mowry785 the court held that it was not obligated to apply a
federal court jurisdictional rule 736 merely because a stay of proceedings was
filed pursuant to the FAA. A customer sued two stock brokerage firms alleg-
ing breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud and negligence in the
management of his securities portfolio. 73 7 The defendants' motion for a stay of
proceedings pending arbitration was granted and plaintiff sought an interlocu-
725. Id. at 328 n. 3.
726. Id. at 328.
727. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
728. 583 F. Supp. at 328. The court indicated that the FAA controlled regard-
less of whether Missouri would enforce the arbitration agreement under the UAA.
However, the court's analysis was limited and it did not discuss the effect of the South-
land decision.
729. 101 Wash. 2d 585, 681 P.2d 253 (1984) (en banc).
730. Id. at _, 681 P.2d at 255.
731. Id. at , 681 P.2d at 253.
732. Id. Two of the five plaintiffs signed a "customer's agreement" containing an
arbitration clause. The arbitration clause had no effect on the remaining plaintiffs.
733. Id. at -, 681 P.2d at 254.
734. Id. at , 681 P.2d at 255.
735. 478 A.2d 299 (Me. 1984).
736. Under the federal rules, "a stay of proceedings involving an action at law is
analogous to an injunction, and an injunction is appealable in the federal courts pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)." Id. at 301.
737. Id. at 300.
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tory appeal from that order. The court denied the appeal saying "[a]lthough
the issue of arbitrability involves substantive federal law . . . the question of
appealability depends on this Court's interpretation of state procedural
requirements."78 8
As a result of Southland, most state statutes which limit the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration clauses are invalid. Thus, courts, in following Southland,
consistently hold that arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA,
notwithstanding state law to the contrary. The UAA, however, does not con-
flict with the FAA with regard to the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
The procedural provisions of the UAA should remain applicable in actions
brought in state courts, regardless of whether the FAA was utilized to enforce
the arbitration agreement.
738. Id. at 301.
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